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 “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video 
 
Jacqueline D. Lipton* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In January 2009, the Camera Phone Predator Alert bill was introduced into 
Congress.  It raised serious concerns about privacy rights in the face of digital 
video technology.  In so doing, it brought to light a worrying gap in current 
privacy regulation – the lack of rules relating to digital video privacy.  To date, 
digital privacy regulation has focused on text records that contain personal data.  
Little attention has been paid to privacy in video files that may portray 
individuals in inappropriate contexts, or in an unflattering or embarrassing light.  
As digital video technology, including inexpensive cellphone cameras, is now 
becoming widespread in the hands of the public, the regulatory focus must shift.   
Once a small percentage of online content, digital video is now appearing at an 
exponential rate.  This is largely due to the growth of online social networking 
platforms such as YouTube and Facebook.  Sharing video online has become a 
global phenomenon, while the lack of effective privacy protection for these 
images has become a global problem.  Digital video poses four distinct problems 
for privacy, arising from: de-contextualization, dissemination, aggregation, and 
permanency of video information.  While video shares some of these attributes 
with text, its unique qualities necessitate a separate study of video privacy 
regulation.  This article identifies a rationale for, and critiques suggested 
approaches to, digital video privacy.  It argues that legal regulation, without 
more, is unlikely to provide necessary solutions.  Instead, it advocates a new 
multi-modal approach consisting of a matrix of legal rules, social norms, system 
architecture, market forces, public education, and non-profit institutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In my mind and in my car, we can't rewind we've gone too far.  
Pictures came and broke your heart, put the blame on VTR. 
 
- The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star”1 
 
Once upon a time, a passenger’s dog defecated on the floor of a subway car in 
South Korea.  While unremarkable in itself, this story quickly became an Internet 
sensation when the passenger refused to clean the mess, even after being offered a tissue 
by a fellow traveler.2  Someone on the train, an anonymous face in the crowd, took photos 
of the woman with a cellphone camera.  These images were promptly posted on a popular 
Korean blog.  The aim was to shame the unrepentant and socially irresponsible dog 
owner.
3
  Ultimately, the humiliation attached to this incident resulted in a firestorm of 
criticism that caused her to quit her job.4  This story is one of a number of recent episodes 
illustrating how a person’s privacy can be destroyed at the push of a button, using the 
simplest and most ubiquitous combination of digital technologies – the cellphone camera 
and the Internet.5  Another salient example of this phenomenon involved “Star Wars kid” 
– a Canadian teenager who filmed himself playing with a golf ball retriever as if it was a 
light-saber from the Star Wars movies.  His video was posted to the Internet without his 
authorization.  It was then adopted by a variety of amateur video enthusiasts on services 
such as YouTube.6  They created many popular, but extremely humiliating, mash-up 
videos7 of the youth.8  The young man ended up dropping out of school.  He also required 
psychiatric care, including a period of institutionalization at a children’s psychiatric 
facility.9   
                                                 
1
  The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star” (song lyrics), available at 
http://www.lyricsondemand.com/onehitwonders/videokilledtheradiostarlyrics.html, last viewed on May 14, 
2008. 
2
  JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, 211 (2008). 
3
  DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:  GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET, 
1 (2007) [hereinafter, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION]. 
4
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211. 
5
  id., at 99 (“One holder of a mobile phone camera can irrevocably compromise someone else’s 
privacy …”).  On camera phones in particular, see discussion in Alan Kato Ku, Talk is Cheap, But a 
Picture is Worth a Thousand Words:  Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera Phone Technology, 45 SANTA 
CLARA L REV 679 (2005) 
6
  See www.youtube.com, last viewed on September 29, 2008. 
7
  Wikipedia currently defines a “mashup” as “a digital media file containing any or all of text, 
graphics, audio, video and animation drawn from pre-existing sources, to create a new derivative work”:  
Wikipedia definition of “digital mashup”, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashup_(digital), last 
viewed on September 29, 2008. 
8
  ZITTRAIN, supra note __, at 211 (discussion of “Star Wars kid” scenario);  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE 
OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 43-48 (discussion of “Star Wars Kid” example of a video-based privacy 
invasion that harmed an individual’s reputation and caused ongoing harm to him in the real world). 
9
  Wired News Report, Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, July 24, 2003, WIRED, available at 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757, last viewed on July 23, 2008 (“Ghyslain was 
so teased about the video, he dropped out of school and finished the semester at a children's psychiatric 
ward, according to a lawsuit filed in the Raza's hometown of Trois-Rivières, Quebec.”); ZITTRAIN, supra 
note ___, at 212 (“The student who made the [Star Wars kid] video has been reported to have been 
traumatized by its circulation…”). 
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If these episodes are not enough to raise the specter of serious harm, consider the 
fate of “Bus Uncle” in Hong Kong.  This man was physically assaulted in a targeted 
attack at the restaurant where he worked.  The attack ensued after online posting of a 
video depicting him speaking loudly on his cellphone on a bus and ignoring requests of 
other passengers to be quiet.10  Video privacy concerns have not gone unnoticed by 
Congress:  for example, the Camera Phone Predator Alert bill,11 introduced in January 
2009, aims to allay fears about the exploitation of the public12 through inappropriate and 
unauthorized cellphone photography.13  The bill would require all cellphones to make an 
audible sound when taking a photograph to alert potential subjects that they may have 
been captured in a digital video file that could later be posted online.14 
 
We are witnessing the emergence of a worrying new trend:  peers15 intruding into 
each other’s privacy and anonymity with video and multi-media files in ways that harm 
the subjects of the digital files.16  There is a mismatch between these harms and available 
legal remedies, notably those arising out of privacy and defamation law.17  Even new laws 
                                                 
10
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (“The famed “Bus Uncle” of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus 
passenger who politely asked him to speak more quietly on his mobile phone.  The mobile phone user 
learned an important lesson in etiquette when a third person captured the argument and then uploaded it to 
the Internet, where 1.3 million people have viewed one version of the exchange …. Weeks after the video 
was posted, the Bus Uncle was beaten up in a targeted attack at the restaurant where he worked.”) 
11
  H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 2009). 
12
  In this respect, it focuses on children and adolescents:  Camera Phone Predator Alert bill, H.R. 414 
(111th Cong., 2009), § 2 (“Congress finds that children and adolescents have been exploited by photographs 
taken in dressing rooms and public places with the use of a camera phone.”) 
13
  See Priya Ganapati, New Bill Asks For Cameraphones to Go Clickety Clack, Wired Blog Network 
(Jan. 26, 2009) (available at http://blog.wired.com/gadgets/2009/01/new-bill-asks-f.html, last viewed on 
January 27, 2009). 
14
  Camera Phone Predator Alert bill H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 2009), § 3(a) (“Beginning 1 year after 
the date of enactment of this Act, any mobile phone containing a digital camera that is manufactured for 
sale in the United States shall sound a tone or other sound audible within a reasonable radius of the phone 
whenever a photograph is taken with the camera in such phone. A mobile phone manufactured after such 
date shall not be equipped with a means of disabling or silencing such tone or sound.”)  In fact, such a law 
already exists in Japan:  Ganapati, supra note ___ (“Japan already requires all cameraphones including the 
iPhone to make an audible noise when taking a photograph.”) 
15
  In this context I use the term “peers” in a broad sense, referring to members of society with equal 
access to each other via cellphone pictures and day-to-day interactions.  Unless the context otherwise 
requires, the term is not intended to connate particularly close personal relationships.   
16
  See also Andrew McClurg, Kiss and Tell:  Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through 
Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L REV 887, 927 (2006) (“[T]echnology has made it much 
easier for people to take embarrassing pictures of others, both with and without consent, and to widely 
disseminate them via the Internet.”); 928 (“Digital cameras and camcorders are specifically designed to be 
connected to computers and to deliver pictures across worldwide networks in an instant.”); ZITTRAIN, supra 
note ___, at 221 (“The central problem [for regulating privacy on the Internet] is that the organizations 
creating, maintaining, using, and disseminating records of identifiable personal data are no longer just 
“organizations” – they are people who take pictures and stream them online, who blog about their reactions 
to a lecture or a class or a meal, and who share on social sites rich descriptions of their friends and 
interactions.”) 
17
  Existing privacy torts generally do not extend to activities in public places, even where one would 
assume the video subject had some expectation of privacy or anonymity:  see discussion in Part II.A.2 
infra.  Defamation  law will not sanction the publication of truthful material.  A “defamatory” statement is 
a false statement that potentially harms a person’s reputation:  Arlen Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial 
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such as the proposed Camera Phone Predator Alert bill would only notify a person that a 
picture of her may have been taken.  It would do nothing to stem the tide of global online 
dissemination of a damaging image of a person.  While it is now trite to say that the 
Internet poses significant risks to privacy, these risks have previously manifested 
themselves in the collection, use, and dissemination of text-based personal records by 
governments,18 businesses,19 health care providers,20 Internet intermediaries,21 and 
prospective employers.22  Today, we need to add concerns about unauthorized uses of our 
personal information by our peers over networks such as MySpace,23 Facebook,24 Flickr,25 
and Youtube,26 much of it in video formats.27  An image of an individual in an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Falsehood, and the First Amendment:  A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV 309, 334 (1993) (“The 
common law defines defamation as the publication of a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff. 
Defamatory statements, by definition, tend to harm the plaintiff's reputation.”). 
18
  Professor Solove has, in fact, devoted a large part of a book to these issues:  Solove, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON, Part III:  Government Access (2004) [hereinafter, THE DIGITAL PERSON] 
19
  id., at 4 (“Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of personal information and to 
analyze it to predict the consumer’s behavior.  Through various analytic techniques, marketers construct 
models of what products particular customers will desire and how to encourage customers to consume.  
Companies know how we spend our money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we 
live.  They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views, and health problems.  Not only do 
companies know what we have already purchased, but they also have a good idea about what books we will 
soon buy or what movies we will want to see.”) 
20
  See, for example, Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:  
Protecting the Security Of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 331 
(2007); Patricia Sánchez Abril and Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a Techno-Social World:  A Cyber-
Patient’s Bill of Rights, 6 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 244 
(2008). 
21
  See, for example, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy? Proposed Google/Doubleclick 
Deal, available at http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ , last viewed on July 21, 2008 (expressing concern 
about ability of Internet intermediaries such as search engine Google and Internet advertising firm 
Doubleclick to monitor users’ online behavior in the context of proposed merger negotiations between 
Google and Doubleclick).   
22
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203 (discussing employers’ practices 
with respect to ascertaining and using online information about prospective hires). 
23
  MySpace is a social networking service where individuals can search for and communicate with 
old and new friends: see www.myspace.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008. 
24
  Facebook describes itself as a “social utility that connects you with the people around you.”:  
www.facebook.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008. 
25
  Flickr describes itself as “almost certainly the best online photo management and sharing 
application in the world”:  www.flickr.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008. 
26
  YouTube is an online file sharing service for video files:  www.youtube.com, last viewed on July 
22, 2008.  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 40 (“Anybody can post videos of 
anybody else on YouTube.  People can post pictures of you or write about you in their blogs.  Even if you 
aren’t exhibiting your private life online, it may still wind up being exposed by somebody else.”) 
27
  Throughout this article, “video” refers collectively to still images and multi-media video files.  
While I recognize there are important qualitative differences between these kinds of files, the aim of this 
Article is to draw a line between text-based privacy incursions, and those incursions that involve different 
kinds of media.  In later work, I hope to draw more subtle distinctions between different non-text formats 
for online information.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 221 (noting that new threats to privacy online 
arise from peer based multimedia content being disseminated on the Internet, as opposed to the traditional 
threats where organizations collated text based data about private individuals). 
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embarrassing situation might well affect her chances of employment,28 education, or 
health insurance.29  As in the examples of “Star Wars kid”, “dog poop girl”, and “Bus 
Uncle”, the consequences of such unauthorized dissemination can be devastating.   
 
Video images are qualitatively different from text-based data in a variety of 
ways.30  Nevertheless, most privacy literature fails to acknowledge that fact.  This Article 
focuses on how best to protect video privacy in an age of online social networking.  This 
issue must be considered urgently by law and policy makers to avoid the entrenchment of 
privacy-destroying norms when online social networking (OSN) technologies reach a 
critical mass point.31  This Article argues that legal regulation alone is unlikely to solve 
society’s video privacy problems.32  It advocates a multi-modal approach that combines 
six regulatory modalities: legal rules, social norms,33 system architecture,34 market 
forces,35 public education, and private/non-profit institutions.36  Part II identifies gaps in 
privacy law with respect to online video privacy.  It notes that, current tort laws are ill-
suited to the digital age, and are globally disharmonized.  Part III identifies practical and 
                                                 
28
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 38 (“Employers are looking at social 
network site profiles of prospective employees.  Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for 
anything they can find out about people they are considering for positions.”) 
29
  id.  On the other hand, there is some suggestion that the widespread availability of personal 
information online cannot be stopped and might actually be beneficial to society.  See, for example, Lior 
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation:  Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NORTHWESTERN 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, forthcoming, October 2008 (arguing that basing decisions on real information 
rather than dangerous and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall) 
[hereinafter, Reputation Nation] 
30
  JON MILLS, PRIVACY:  THE LOST RIGHT, 35-37 (2008) (noting the importance of recognizing that 
information available through different modes of communication - such as text, audio tape, still images, 
and video recordings – have different impacts on privacy); 238 (“courts may be more inclined to protect 
against intrusive images than intrusive words”); 263 (describing British courts’ readiness to extend privacy 
protections to photographs, but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct).  See also discussion in 
Part II. 
31
  That is, of course, assume they haven’t already reached that point.  See discussion in Gaia 
Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New:  Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 921 (2006) (noting importance of at least thinking about making regulatory 
decisions to protect privacy interests before privacy-destroying norms become entrenched when the take-up 
of the technology reaches a critical mass) [hereinafter, New Technologies]. 
32
  JACK GOLDSMITH and TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?  ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD, 181 (2006) (“There’s no reason to doubt that most people’s lives are dominated not by law but by 
social norms, morality, and the market, or that the Internet is deeply influenced by its code.”) 
33
  Katherine Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation:  A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 
RUTGERS L REV 1235,1238 (2005) (“Social norms are primarily understood as means to coordinate the 
behavior of individuals in a social group. Thus, norms may help to solve coordination problems - by 
determining how pedestrians pass one another on the street - and collective action problems - by 
stigmatizing littering - when individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.”) 
34
  See discussion in Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L REV 553 (1998) (describing how digital technology can be utilized as a 
form of regulatory mechanism for online conduct) [hereinafter, Lex Informatica]. 
35
  Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIFORNIA LAW REV 1231, 1253 (2001) (“Markets constrain 
behavior through price.  If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will drive less.”) 
36
  These may be defined as institutions with social benefits, rather than commercial profits, as their 
aim.  See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEXAS L REV, forthcoming 2008 (describing the American 
Libraries Association as a regulatory institution in this sense with respect to the bill of rights it developed to 
protect interests of library patrons in 1939) [hereinafter, Intellectual Privacy]. 
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theoretical justifications for, and possible approaches to, regulating online video privacy.  
Part IV sets out a framework for a new multi-modal regulatory approach based on the six 
modalities identified above.  Part V concludes with a discussion of future directions for 
online video privacy regulation.   
 
II.  ONLINE VIDEO PRIVACY:  GAPS IN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms, but they are also enabling unparalleled 
invasions of privacy. 
 
- Electronic Frontier Foundation37 
 
Advances in video technologies have historically facilitated dramatic social 
transformations.  In the late nineteenth century, when photography first became relatively 
cheap and portable,38 commentators expressed concerns about the development of the 
“snap camera” by Kodak.39  This camera for the first time enabled private individuals and 
members of the press to take and distribute candid photographs in a way never before 
possible.40  It was also what ultimately spurred on Warren and Brandeis to publish their 
seminal article on privacy.41  Their article shaped the development of American privacy 
law for more than a century.42  The fact that it was derived from the authors’ concerns 
about video privacy suggests something important about video that differentiates it from 
other forms of information.43   
 
Today’s online video technologies create new threats to privacy.  With cellphone 
cameras and the Internet, the dissemination of video – both still and multi-media - is now 
                                                 
37
  Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy, available at http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy, last 
viewed on May 12, 2008. 
38
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 107 (“Kodak’s snap camera was cheap 
and portable.  Many more people could afford to own their own camera, and for the first time, candid 
photos of people could be taken.”). 
39
  id, at 107-108. 
40
  Neil Richards and Daniel Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 
96 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 123, 128-9 (2007) (describing Warren and Brandeis’ concern with 
the combination of newspaper sensationalism and new photographic technology enabling more widescale 
candid photography and dissemination of resulting photographs than ever before) [hereinafter, Privacy’s 
Other Path]; DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Warren and Brandeis were 
concerned not only with new [photographic] technology but with how it would intersect with the media.  
The press was highly sensationalistic at the time.”) [hereinafter, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY]. 
41
  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); JON 
MILLS, PRIVACY:  THE LOST RIGHT, 5 (2008) (noting that concerns about the advent of popular 
photography was probably what spurred on Warren and Brandeis in writing this article). 
42
  DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Many scholars have proclaimed Warren 
and Brandeis’s article the foundation of privacy law in the United States.”); Richards and Solove, Privacy’s 
Other Path, supra note ___, at 127-8 (describing Warren and Brandeis’ contribution to the privacy debate 
as “Privacy’s Defining Moment” in heading “I”).  
43
  See also MILLS, supra note ___, at 35-37 (noting the importance of recognizing that information 
available through different modes of communication - such as text, audio tape, still images, and video 
recordings – have different impacts on privacy); 238 (“courts may be more inclined to protect against 
intrusive images than intrusive words”); 263 (describing British courts’ readiness to extend privacy 
protections to photographs, but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct). 
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practically instantaneous and potentially global in scope.  The concerns about loss of 
control over personal information are much greater online than even in the gossip rags of 
the nineteenth century.  To be published in a newspaper, albeit a scandal sheet, pictures 
had to make their way into the hands of an entity that produced such a publication.  
Today, anyone can be a publisher.  Photographers do not even need a stand-alone camera 
to capture a candid image – most people can resort to their inexpensive and ever-present 
cellphones.44  The fact that individuals can instantly snap a photograph without even 
thinking to carry a camera, and that they can then disseminate that image instantaneously 
and globally at the push of a button, raises significant problems of decontextualization.  
Compared to the individual writing a text-based account of an event and posting it online, 
the video record is likely to capture more information, including more incidental 
background information than might appear in a text-based record.  Additionally, more 
thought goes into writing the text than into thoughtlessly snapping an image.  Thus, more 
context is likely to be provided in a textual account of the same event.   
 
Images and multi-media files are quite different from text, particularly as reagards 
context.45  Textual data is often iterative.  It tends to be aggregated over a period of time 
from different sources.  This provides it both some context and a greater degree of 
accuracy.  Concerns about digital data have focused on the way in which textual data can 
represent too detailed a profile of a person online46 that is often readily available to third 
parties.  Nevertheless, it may take a whole collection of textual data to suggest something 
that a picture candidly demonstrates in one digital file.  An aggregated text profile, for 
example, may include items that suggest a person is trying to become pregnant.  These 
data may include records involving purchase of ovulation tests, pregnancy tests, 
information on pregnancy, information on in vitro fertilization (IVF), and medical 
appointments with fertility specialists.  However, a video image of the person entering an 
IVF clinic could potentially tell the story in one glance.   
 
Nevertheless, the image lacks context47: for example, the video subject may have 
entered the IVF clinic for a variety of reasons, including to provide support to a friend 
undergoing IVF treatment.  Thus, the aggregated text profile may be a more accurate 
reflection of a data subject’s attempts to become pregnant because it is verifiable by a set 
of data collected over time from a variety of sources.  Of course, it is equally possible 
that the data subject could be purchasing tests and fertility information for a friend just as 
easily as she could be attending an IVF clinic to provide support to a friend.  
Nevertheless, in general, the aggregation of multiple data records across time and from a 
variety of sources is less likely to be misinterpreted than a single image taken out of 
                                                 
44
  See discussion in Kato Ku, supra note ___; Ganapati, supra note ___. 
45
  MILLS, supra note ___, at 35 (“Photos have a different impact than written words, and a video has 
a different impact than photos, as a mode of intrusion.”), 36-37 (noting the importance of recognizing that 
information available through different modes of communication - such as text, audio tape, still images, 
and video recordings – have different impacts on privacy); 238 (“courts may be more inclined to protect 
gainst intrusive images than intrusive words”); 263 (describing British courts’ readiness to extend privacy 
protections to photographs, but not to textual descriptions of particular misconduct). 
46
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 117-121.  
47
  Patricia Sánchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own:  On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 73, 75 (2007) (raising 
contextualization concerns about images disseminated online) [hereinafter, (My)Space]. 
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context.  The more sources and more time involved, the more accurate the data record is 
likely to be.   
 
Outside contextualization concerns, digital video poses additional problems for 
online privacy:  the threat of viral online distribution of private images (dissemination 
problems);48 the possibility of others augmenting the images with additional information - 
true, false, or indeterminate (aggregation problems);49 and the inability of an image 
subject to ever obtain control of the information once it hits cyberspace (permanence 
problems).50  These problems are highlighted below in an examination of gaps in the 
current laws that protect privacy. 
 
A.  PROTECTING ONLINE PRIVACY:  GAPS IN THE LAW 
 
1. Copyright Law 
 
While copyright law has proved extremely effective in protecting property rights 
online, it is of little assistance to those seeking to protect privacy.  Copyright in an image 
is generally granted to the photographer, not the photographic subject.51  As the subject is 
not likely to have been the photographer, copyright law will not help those attempting to 
control dissemination of photographs in which they feature as subjects.  Of course, in the 
unusual case where the subject is the copyright owner,52 a copyright action would be 
                                                 
48
  With respect to the viral distribution of information online generally, see SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 62 (“In the offline world, rarely does gossip hit a tipping point.  The 
process of spreading information to new people takes time, and friends often associate in similar circles, so 
most secrets don’t spread too widely.  The Internet takes this phenomenon and puts it on steroids.  People 
can communicate with tens of thousands – even millions – of people almost simultaneously.  If you put 
something up on the Internet, countless people can access it at the same time.  In an instant, information 
can speed across the globe.”) 
49
  The idea of data aggregation appears as a sub-set of the idea of information processing in 
Professor Solove’s “taxonomy of privacy”.  See, for example, SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra 
note ___, at 118 (“Aggregation is the gathering of information about a person.  A piece of information here 
or there is not very telling, but when combined, bits and pieces of data begin to form a portrait of a person.  
The whole becomes greater than the parts.”)  Adding new information to video images might, in some 
contexts, resemble a form of identification as also contemplated in Professor Solove’s taxonomy:  SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 123 (“Identification is similar to aggregation because both 
involve the combination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a person.  However, 
identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link to the person in the flesh.”)  
50
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 33 (“The Internet … makes gossip a 
permanent reputational stain, one that never fades.  It is available around the world, and with Google it can 
be readily found in less than a second.”), 165 (citing Professor McClurg’s work suggesting that images 
have a quality of permanence that memories lack in the sense that people can scrutinize an image and 
notice details they might not see when observing the original situation); McClurg, supra note ___, at 928 
(“[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet permanently lose control over that 
information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.”); ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (“Lives can be 
ruined after momentary wrongs, even if merely misdeameanors.”); Abril, (My)Space, supra note ___, at 75 
(“Lacking the relative transience of human memory, the digital record has increased the takes of privacy 
today…”). 
51
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184 (“Copyright in a photo is owned 
initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the person whose photo is taken.”). 
52
  Either because she used a timer to take the picture or because someone else assigned copyright in 
the image to her. 
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available for unauthorized distribution of the video online.53  Interestingly, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 incorporated a notice and takedown regime 
that gives an immediate right to have an image removed from a website on the basis of a 
copyright infringement.  However, no similar law has been enacted for intrusions into an 
individual’s privacy or dignity.54 
 
2. Privacy Torts and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
Laws regulating intrusive photography are equally unlikely to help image 
subjects.  While some privacy torts prohibit intrusions into seclusion,55 conduct involving 
OSNs will generally not attract the operation of these laws.  Peer photographs are usually 
taken with the consent of the image subject and in a non-intrusive fashion.56  In many 
cases, the subject has no objection to the taking of the picture, but may later be concerned 
about viral online dissemination.  Laws that regulate intrusive image-capturing are 
therefore not much help when the subject’s concern is with online dissemination.57  Other 
torts aimed at personal privacy will likewise have little to no application: for example, the 
idea of an unauthorized appropriation of a person’s name or likeness will be of little use 
in a peer context.58  For one thing, the appropriation is arguably not unauthorized if the 
subject has consented to the taking of the photograph.59  For another thing, this tort 
requires a commercial profit motive60 which is generally absent in the OSN context, at 
least as between peers.   
                                                 
53
  17 U.S.C. § 106 sets out the rights of a copyright holder to prevent unauthorized reproduction, 
distribution, and preparation of derivative works based on a copyrighted work.   
54
  17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
55
  See, for example, California Civil Code, § 1708.8(a) (“A person is liable for physical invasion of 
privacy when the defendant knowingly enters onto the land of another person without permission or 
otherwise committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to 
capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in 
a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable 
person.”) 
56
  This would also be a shortcoming of the Camera Phone Predator Alert Act, H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 
2009) if it was ever enacted.  It only deals with intrusive image-gathering, and not with any subsequent 
unauthorized dissemination. 
57
  California Civil Code, § 1708.8 (f) specifically states that dissemination of images taken in 
contravention of the earlier provisions of the section is not in and of itself a violation of the section:  “Sale, 
transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the type, or under the 
circumstances, described in this section shall not itself constitute a violation of this section, nor shall this 
section be construed to limit all other rights or remedies of plaintiff in law or equity, including, but not 
limited to, the publication of private facts.” 
58
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort would 
rarely apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private lives or the posting of their photos.”)  The 
same might be said about the right of publicity tort:  ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, at 
§ 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her 
name, likeness, signature, or other personal characteristics.”) [hereinafter, GILSON LALONDE]. 
59
  Of course, there may be cases where the taking of the image is initially authorized, but its 
subsequent use in a commercial context is unauthorized.  The commercial use requirement, however, will 
generally not be made out when peers are simply posting images of each other online. 
60
  Appropriation actually appears as both a distinct limb of privacy law in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, and as a stand-alone tortious action in a number of American state jurisdictions known variously 
as the “right of publicity” or “personality rights tort”.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One 
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other 
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Other privacy torts in the United States focus respectively on public disclosures of 
private facts,61 and on publicity which places a person in a false light in the eyes of the 
public.62  Both of these require some form of public disclosure63 which may be missing in 
a closed social network such as Facebook or MySpace – although distribution over an 
open network such as YouTube or Flickr would be another story.64  However, even where 
there is a public disclosure, it is an open question whether the distribution will amount to 
a disclosure of private facts, or will present a person in a false light.  An individual may 
object to the dissemination of an image even though it does not disclose any private facts, 
and does not present her in a false light.65  The former tort also generally requires that the 
private facts in question must have been shameful by an objective standard which is often 
difficult to prove.66  The information must also not have been newsworthy67 - a standard 
that has proved notoriously difficult to define.68 
                                                                                                                                                 
for invasion of his privacy.”).  For an example of a right of publicity tort, see California Civil Code, § 
3344(a) (“Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any 
manner on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting 
purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case 
of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by 
the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”).   
61
  For a discussion of current problems and future directions with this branch of privacy law in the 
online context, see Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARVARD 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2007) [hereinafter, Recasting Privacy]. 
62
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the 
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to 
the public.”) 
63
  id, § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before 
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if  (a) the false light 
in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in 
which the other would be placed.”); Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 9-11 (discussing 
practical difficulties of individual plaintiffs establishing requisite disclosures of private facts both in the 
physical world and online). 
64
  A “closed” network is one in which the participants have some control over who has access to 
information and videos they post online, while an open network is generally accessible to anyone with an 
Internet connection. 
65
  One example of this, although not a “peer” based incursion into privacy is the example of the 
“lady eating a peach” video that David Letterman repeatedly showed on his late night television program.  
It embarrassed the woman who was caught on camera eating an over-ripe peach indelicately at the U.S. 
Open, but it did not show anything false about her:  David Usborne, Peach Lady Puts Squeeze on TV Star, 
THE INDEPENDENT, London (Feb 7, 1996) (full text available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_/ai_n14027742, last viewed on January 12, 2009). 
66
  Jonathan B Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort:  An Exploration of the Private 
Domain, 55 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW 425, 439 (1996) (“Whether a fact is private by nature - that is, 
whether a reasonable person would feel seriously aggrieved by its disclosure - is the subject of some 
disagreement.”) 
67
  Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 265 (“[T]o succeed on a privacy tort claim, the information 
must not be of public concern.  If the … information disclosed is newsworthy or of public concern, the 
aggrieved is precluded from recover in tort, as such recovery is preempted by the formidable First 
Amendment.”) 
68
  Mintz, supra note ___, at 441-442 (“Facts of "legitimate public concern" or "newsworthy" facts, 
even if legally private, may be disclosed without any liability under this tort. Regardless of whether a 
plaintiff must affirmatively prove that facts disclosed were not newsworthy, or whether defendants can be 
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Related to the privacy torts is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.69  Like the privacy torts, this tort is likely to be of limited use in the situations 
under consideration in this Article.70  However, that might change if courts reassess the 
contours of the tort in light of online activities.71  The main problem with this tort is that it 
has generally required outrageous or malicious conduct on the part of a defendant.72  It is 
unlikely that private individuals posting videos of each other online would be found to be 
engaging in such conduct.73   
 
3. Defamation 
 
For defamation law to assist a person concerned about unauthorized dissemination 
of an image online, the dissemination would have to amount to a defamatory 
communication.74  This would require proof that the image is both false and harmful to 
the subject’s reputation.75  This is likely an insurmountable hurdle in most cases involving 
OSNs.  Images are unlikely to be false for defamation purposes unless they have been 
doctored.  Further, defamation law can do little about viral distributions of personal 
images, or about the permanence problem.  Enforcement of a defamation order76 online 
can be problematic if the information in question exists in multiple websites and in 
multiple jurisdictions by the time the order is made.77  Additionally, online intermediaries 
such as Internet service providers, who serve as conduits for potentially defamatory 
content – and are often the easiest potential defendants to identify – are generally immune 
from liability.78 
 
4. Data Protection Law in the European Union 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
said to enjoy a privilege or a defense, many have declared that the broad scope of the newsworthiness 
doctrine has "decimated the tort."”) 
69
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1977). 
70
  Abril, (My)Space, supra note ___, at 81 (noting that the tort is ineffectual in the OSN context 
because conduct in question is usually not sufficiently “extreme and outrageous” and because many courts 
require physical manifestations of the claimed emotional distress). 
71
  MILLS, supra note ___, at 195 (“The law [on intentional infliction of emotional distress] is still in 
a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort have not yet been determined.”) 
72
  id. 
73
  It is also unlikely that OSN providers would be found to be directly liable for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  Any action for secondary liability against an OSN provider would also likely prove 
fruitless because of the application of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996:  MILLS, supra 
note ___, at 35 (discussing recent judicial applications of the Communications Decency Act, § 230, to 
immunize Internet service providers from liability for information that is posted by a user of the service). 
74
  Langvardt, supra note ___, at 334. 
75
  id. 
76
  Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger:  Legal Protections, Self Regulation, and 
Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 343, 368-372 (2006) (describing different kinds of 
defamation remedies that may be sought online including a retraction, an injunction, and damages). 
77
  id, at 368 (noting that even if the complainant obtains a retraction by the original poster of 
defamatory context, the information is likely available in many other places online, including places like 
the Internet Archive Project that preserves information that has already been retracted from websites) 
78
  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).   
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While this discussion has so far focused largely on American privacy law, 
international comparisons may be instructive.  The European Union, for example, 
provides stronger data protection for its citizens than the United States.  A cornerstone of 
the European Union approach to privacy is the European Union Data Protection 
Directive.79  While the Directive is intended to have a wide reach, it has some limitations 
in the OSN context.  For one thing, it is generally limited to conduct occurring within the 
European Union.80  Thus, it does not have global reach, subject to provisions that extend 
its operation to data about its citizens transmitted to third countries.81  Perhaps more 
importantly, it was drafted with the processing of textual data in mind, largely in the 
context of business or governmental dealings with personal information.  There may be 
some question about the extent to which it would apply in the OSN context. 
 
While “personal data” is defined broadly as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person”,82 there are potentially two important limitations.  
The first is that the Directive covers “information processing activities” which are 
conceived in terms that contemplate largely professional, governmental, or commercial 
activities involving compilations of individual information.  On the other hand, 
“processing” is defined broadly to encapsulate “any operation or set of operations which 
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”.83  Thus, it is possible that the broad 
definition of personal data could include digital video images and the broad definition of 
processing could include dissemination of those images over an OSN.   
 
The second limitation on the Directive’s operation may be more problematic.  
Article 3(2) creates an exception for the processing of personal data “by a natural person 
in the course of a purely personal or household activity”.  Social networking activities 
might well fall within this category.  If that is the case, they would not be covered by the 
Directive.  Of course, the Directive may apply to OSNs that provide forums for online 
networking, such as Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr.  These services are businesses that 
are not engaged in purely personal or household activities.  An aggrieved plaintiff may 
have recourse against a social networking site,84 but arguably not against specific peers 
who post unauthorized images on the service. 
 
                                                 
79
  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data. 
80
  Most of the articles of the Directive apply to Member States of the European Union.  However, 
some provisions impact on transfers of data to third countries:  See Data Protection Directive, Articles 25 
and 26.   
81
  Data Protection Directive, Articles 25 & 26. 
82
  id., Article 2(a). 
83
  id., Article 2(b). 
84
  Of course, in the United States at least, there is a possibility that actions against online service 
providers relating to the posting of information by users of the service would fail because of the operation 
of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) which immunizes Internet intermediaries from suit with respect to the speech of 
others.   
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Interestingly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2003 interpreted Article 3(2) 
of the Directive as not excusing the mere posting on a publicly available website of 
gossipy text relating to private individuals by a peer who worked in a church with them.85  
It remains to be seen whether similar reasoning would apply to video, as opposed to text 
records, or would apply to closed as opposed to open Internet sites.  The court’s concern 
in this case appeared to be with data being made available to an indefinite number of 
people.86  Would posting information on a closed site such as Facebook meet this 
criterion when arguably only a limited number of people can access the information?  
The ECJ was also concerned that particularly sensitive information relating to a health 
condition – a foot injury – had been disclosed on the Internet.87  Health information 
receives special protection under the Directive.88  It remains to be seen whether the ECJ’s 
reasoning would apply to less sensitive information, such as someone being 
photographed drinking at a party, or kissing their best friend’s girlfriend. 
  
B.  LIMITATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
 
Another possibility for protecting online video privacy might be found in OSNs’ 
terms of use.  OSNs currently vary widely in the extent to which they impose terms on 
their users to respect others’ privacy.89  YouTube and Flickr, for example, allow large 
scale public dissemination of video with few privacy protections.  These services exercise 
some control over contents,90 but rely heavily on users to self-police.91  Yahoo’s terms of 
                                                 
85
  Re Bodil Lindqvist, Paras 46-48 (ECJ, Luxemborg, November 6, 2003, full text available at:  
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79968893C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET, last viewed on 
December 16, 2008). 
86
  id., at ¶ 47. 
87
  id, at ¶ 12. 
88
  Data Protection Directive, Art. 8(1) (“Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”) (emphasis added) 
89
  They can also change them at any time without notice to the consumer.  In fact, in the early days 
of the Internet, a Canadian court expressly recognized a general Internet service provider’s ability to do just 
that – and was prepared to enforce the changed terms:  1267623 Ontario Inc v Nexx Online Inc, [1999] O.J. 
No. 2246, ¶ 31 (Court File No. C20546/99, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Toronto, Ontario, June 14, 
1999) (“[Defendant] is permitted to add terms to the Contract precluding a … client sending unsolicited 
bulk e-mail directly, or through a third party.”); Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 267 (noting that online 
contracts are effectively built on shifting sands and can be changed unilaterally without notice to 
consumers). 
90
  See, for example, clause 7.B of YouTube’s Terms of Use:  “YouTube reserves the right to decide 
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for 
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or 
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a 
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior 
notice and at its sole discretion.” (available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008).  
However, note that some commentators have suggested that many of these policies are not actually 
enforced in practice:  Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 14, fn 84 (noting that there is 
little to no apparent enforcement of MySpace’s terms of use as an example of lack of effective policing by 
online social network services providers). 
91
  See, for example, clause 6 of Yahoo’s Terms of Use relating to “Member Conduct”, available at 
info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008; clause 6 of YouTube’s 
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use, for example, which are expressly incorporated into agreements to use Flickr, provide 
that each subscriber agrees not to use the online service to upload or distribute content 
that is:  “unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, 
obscene, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or 
otherwise objectionable”.92  YouTube’s Terms of Use provide that users agree not to post 
material that is:  “copyrighted, protected by trade secret or otherwise subject to third 
party proprietary rights, including privacy and publicity rights” without permission of the 
rights-holder.93   
 
Some closed networks such as Facebook incorporate more strongly worded 
privacy protections into their terms of use.  Not only does Facebook include a clause very 
similar to the above terms from Yahoo and YouTube,94 it also requests that its 
subscribers not use the service to upload:  “any videos other than those of a personal 
nature that: (i) are of you or your friends, (ii) are taken by you or your friends, or (iii) are 
original art or animation created by you or your friends.”95   Additionally, Facebook’s 
terms of use provide that:  “You may not post, transmit, or share User Content on the Site 
or Service that you did not create or that you do not have permission to post.”96  
However, it is not clear whose permission is required to post what information: for 
example, if I take a group photograph of my high school class, do I have to obtain the 
whole class’ permission to post the photograph?  What form does that permission have to 
take?  If I simply ask my classmates at the time of taking the photo whether anyone 
minds if I post the photo on my Facebook page, and no one expressly objects, would that 
constitute permission?   
 
What if I take a photograph or video in a crowded mall that includes people I 
know and people I don’t know?  Do I need to obtain permission from all the photographic 
subjects to post the photograph online?  What if I take a video of two otters swimming 
side by side – for some reason a popular YouTube contribution.97  Whose permission do I 
need, if any, to show this video online?  The zookeeper’s?  Any bystanders who may 
appear in the picture?  What if one of the bystanders is doing something embarrassing, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Terms of Use relating to “User Submissions and Conduct”, available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last 
viewed on May 14, 2008. 
92
  Yahoo’s Terms of Use, clause 6(a), available at info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-
173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008 (emphasis added). 
93
  YouTube’s Terms of Use, clause 6.D., available at  http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on 
May 14, 2008 (emphasis added). 
94
  Facebook’s Terms of Use, “User Conduct” clause, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
95
  id.  See also Facebook’s Code of Conduct, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/codeofconduct.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.  Facebook further provides its 
users with a set of Privacy Principles organized around two “core principles”, the second of which states 
that:  “There is an increasing amount of information available out there, and you may want to know what 
relates to you, your friends, and people around you. We want to help you easily get that information.”:  
Facebook Principles, available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
96
  Facebook Terms of Use, Clause on “User Content Posted on the Site”, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
97
  YouTube, “Otters Holding Hands” (available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epUk3T2Kfno, last viewed on July 23, 2008). 
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such as picking her nose or breastfeeding her baby?  What if one of the bystanders is 
kissing or holding hands with a homosexual partner, and it turns out that the person is not 
openly gay?  Do I owe any greater concern for their privacy because of the potential 
discomfort, embarrassment or harm it might cause them to have people see this conduct 
online?   
 
With respect to the “permission to post” requirement, it is likely that the drafting 
intention was to capture permission of those with proprietary interests in relevant content, 
such as copyrights or trademarks.  It seems reasonable to require me to obtain permission 
to post something, like a movie clip, that might otherwise infringe copyright.  However, 
privacy rights work differently – if at all – in this context because it is not always clear 
that there is a rights holder in this context as contemplated by many OSN terms of use.  
Even if there is an obvious victim harmed by the posting of an image, the nature of her 
legal rights in the image is unclear.  Some commentators have suggested that privacy 
should be treated as an intangible property right,98 but there is little consensus on this 
point.99   
 
                                                 
98
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of 
privacy); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN L REV 1283, 1288-1294 
(2000) (describing various theories of private information as property). 
99
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 27 (“Extending property concepts to 
personal information … has difficulties.  Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others, 
cannot be eradicated from their minds.  Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed 
simultaneously within the minds of millions.  This is why intellectual-property law protects particular 
tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves.  The complexity of personal 
information is that it is both an expression of the self and a set of facts – a historical record of one’s 
behavior.”); Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295 (“Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a 
privacy-as-property solution carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding 
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy 
and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of expression; of self-government; 
and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be 
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put. 
That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our current First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Thus, the idea of creating property rights in personal data raises fundamental constitutional issues. If it 
looked likely that a property rights model would prove to be an effective tool for protecting personal data 
privacy, it might be worthwhile to balance the privacy and free speech interests to see which one weighed 
more. [H]owever, a property rights model would be ineffective in protecting data privacy. It would, in all 
likelihood, make the problem worse.”); Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 
393, 397-401 (1978) (critiquing theories that favour personal property rights in private information); Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say?  One View of the Public Domain, 73 
FORDHAM L REV 297, 348-9 (2004) (“[F]rom the birth of the common law right of privacy, courts 
recognized that there is a downside to granting individuals control over how others can use information 
about them.  It significantly strips others of the wherewithal to form their own ideas, utilize their own 
observations, and communicate about these things with friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens.  The fear of 
this unconstitutional consequence is why broad newsworthiness rules have cabined the tort almost to the 
point of annihilation.  This strongly suggests that the ability to use speech goods is a necessary element of 
what the First Amendment protects, and that, as a result, it is very risky to allow individuals to “own” or 
control use of their life stories.”) [hereinafter, The Public Domain]; Diane Zimmerman, Information as 
Speech, Information as Goods:  Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WILLIAM AND 
MARY LAW REVIEW 665 (1992) (arguing that the increasing commodification of information potentially 
impinges on First Amendment freedoms) [hereinafter, Information as Speech]. 
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What about the question of the standing of a video subject to bring a complaint 
under an OSN’s terms of use?  Even if that person can establish a sufficient legal interest 
in her image to satisfy the “permission to post” aspect of an OSN’s terms of use, her 
recourse would be to complain to the OSN provider.  It would be up to the provider to 
decide whether the complaint had any merit, and whether to take any action against the 
subscriber, such as removing the posting, or barring the subscriber from the system.100  
The complainant probably has no standing to sue the service provider directly because 
she is not a party to the subscriber’s contract with the service provider.  Additionally, at 
least in the United States, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act probably 
immunizes the service provider from secondary liability for its subscribers’ postings.101 
 
There are further limitations with relying on OSNs’ terms of use to protect 
privacy.  Even Facebook’s requirement that users limit their postings to photographs of 
themselves and their friends, or photographs taken by themselves or their friends, is open 
to interpretation.  On a closed network like Facebook, the term “friends” means 
something different to the way we use the term in the physical world.102  In the physical 
world, we know whether or not we are acquainted with a person.  We may not know 
them, and we may even have forgotten their name, but we are unlikely to consider 
someone we have never met a “friend”.   
 
This is quite different online.  A “friend” on Facebook is anyone who has given 
you permission to join their online network of “friends”, whether or not they have ever 
met you.  Although Facebook contemplates that its subscribers will use the service to find 
people online whom they already know in the real world,103 there is no way to ensure that 
this is the case in practice.  It is easy to make anonymous online contacts on Facebook, 
and for those contacts to quickly be considered “friends”.  These contacts will increase 
the potential recipients of information on a subscriber’s site to many people whom the 
subscriber, and the subject of any information on the subscriber’s website, may not 
                                                 
100
  See, for example, YouTube’s Terms of Use, Clause 7.B (“YouTube reserves the right to decide 
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for 
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or 
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a 
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior 
notice and at its sole discretion.”), available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
101
  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. “) 
102
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 218 (noting that a person’s “friends” network online includes their 
“friends’ friends’ friends.”); See Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at fn 69 (“The online social networking 
environment has brought about a sweeping change in its users’ notions of intimacy, friendship, and 
confidentiality.”)  
103
  For example, Facebook’s information on finding friends online states that:  “Your friends on 
Facebook are the same friends, acquaintances and family members that you communicate with in the real 
world.” (available at https://register.facebook.com/findfriends.php?ref_friends, last viewed on May 14, 
2008).  Facebook also prohibits the use of aliases online so that people who think they are being contacted 
by someone they actually know are really being contacted by that person:  for example, the User Conduct 
clause of Facebook’s Terms of Use prohibits impersonating any person, falsely representing yourself, and 
creating a false identity (available at http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008). 
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actually know.104  Thus, “friends” in a closed network’s terms of use may be a 
deceptively comforting concept.105  Commentators have recognized a number of 
additional limitations with relying on contractual mechanisms to protect privacy online.  
These limitations include the fact that such contracts are often not consistently 
enforced,106 and the fact that there are insufficient inexpensive and accessible online 
dispute resolution services available for contract-based disputes.107  Another shortcoming 
of reliance on contractual privacy protections is the fact that the onus is currently on users 
of an online service to continually check back for changes in privacy policies.108  As 
these policies often vary from service to service, and Internet users tend to use a variety 
of services,109 this can be a particularly onerous burden.  Contractual terms about privacy 
are also often written in abstruse or legalistic terms which are difficult for users to 
comprehend.110 
                                                 
104
  Of course, the practical problems can potentially be greater on an open network that does not even 
attempt to limit dissemination of information to “friends”. 
105
  One could argue that in the online world individuals have a responsibility to exercise more care 
than they currently do about who they befriend.  The problem is that this is easier said than done.  In the 
real world there are physical constraints on who can be befriended and how many friends one can make – 
in terms of time and geography.  Additionally, in the physical world, one can glean more cues than in 
virtual space about whether the rewards of befriending someone outweigh the risks.  These cues come from 
watching the person interact in real world situations.  In physical spaces, we also recognize different 
“levels” of friendship.  We can thus repose less trust in someone we do not know very well.  In the OSN 
context, however, the choice is effectively binary – someone is either your “friend”, entitling them access 
to anything you post online, or they are not your friend, and therefore not entitled to access your online 
materials at all:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 202 (noting that technologies like 
Facebook require a binary definition of the term “friend” – a “friend” is permitted access to your 
information while a non-friend is not - while a social network in the real world is much more complex).  
There are no gradations of friendship online, although there is no necessary technological impediment to 
developing such levels.  A system could be developed in the future that would allow users to exercise 
discretion about who received what, and how much, information from them.  This could be done by 
building more “levels of friendship” into OSN technologies.  Thus, one could identify online peers as either 
“good friends”, “friends”, or “acquaintances” and differentiate levels of access to personal information 
accordingly.  Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 272 (suggesting the development of levels or “zones” of 
relationships in the context of private health information available online). 
106
  Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 267 (“Spotty enforcement and lack of mechanisms for dispute 
resolution further weaken the power of contract law online.”) 
107
  id. 
108
  id. (“Website contracts are built on shifting sands.  The professed ability of many operators to 
change terms of use at any moment and without prior notice leaves users in a constant state of uncertainty 
about their rights and privacy expectations.”) 
109
  id. (“[T]erms of use and privacy policies vary from website to website, making true understanding 
of each contract … difficult and impracticable, especially since most users visit several websites a day.” 
110
  id. (“Many user contracts are written abstrusely or in a legalistic style, dissuading even the most 
punctilious consumer from taking time out of her online pursuit to carefully read and understand them.”) 
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III.  WHY (NOT) REGULATE VIDEO PRIVACY? 
 
A.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VIDEO PRIVACY REGULATION 
 
So far, this article has addressed practical problems relating to digital video 
privacy, and gaps in the existing legal framework.  The next step is to find justifications 
for a new approach to video privacy.  In doing so, four potential criticisms of the idea of 
taking a new regulatory approach should be addressed.  They include the argument that 
there is no accepted theoretical basis for regulating privacy.  It is not clear whether 
privacy is a property right, an aspect of personhood, or something else.  In the absence of 
a clear and unified theoretical underpinning for privacy rights, some may argue that 
regulation is undesirable.  The second reservation against video privacy regulation is the 
argument that it is more appropriate to regulate specific harms resulting from discrete 
privacy incursions than to regulate privacy more generally.  Discrete harms may include 
loss of employment111 or employment prospects,112 physical injury,113 psychological 
harm,114 and denial of access to education or health services.  A third reservation about 
video privacy regulation would suggest that the First Amendment may be an 
insurmountable barrier to the regulation of truthful speech about private individuals, at 
least in the United States.  And a final concern about regulating video privacy is the idea 
that such regulation is impracticable because of the scale and global nature of online 
privacy problems.  The remainder of this article addresses these issues and suggests a 
way forward by creating a multi-modal framework for online video privacy regulation.115 
 
B.  THE SEARCH FOR A UNIFIED THEORY OF PRIVACY 
 
One thorny issue in any discussion of reworking or extending privacy protections 
is the question of the theoretical basis on which this might be done.  Despite well over a 
century of discourse about the legal nature of privacy, no clear consensus has emerged.116  
                                                 
111
  As in the “dog poop girl” example:  see Part I supra. 
112
  As in the AutoAdmit case involving the unauthorized posting of sexually explicit information 
about Yale students, one of whom alleged she lost a job offer as a result of the posting:  see Isaac Arnsdorf, 
AutoAdmit Case Moves Forward, YALE DAILY NEWS, Jan, 31, 2008 (available at 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/23231, last viewed on January 12, 2009). 
113
  As in the “bus uncle: example:  see Part I supra. 
114
  As in the case of “Star Wars kid”:  see Part I supra. 
115
  The first three issues are addressed in Part III infra, while the final issue about the practicality of 
regulating for video privacy online is addressed in Part IV infra along with the discussion of a suggested 
framework for video privacy regulation. 
116
  In fact, even Professor Solove’s groundbreaking attempts to create a conception or taxonomy of 
privacy are not pinned down to one concrete unifying theory:  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra 
note ___, at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not based upon any overarching principle.  We do not 
need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems …. If we focus on the problems, we can 
better understand and address them.  I aim to shift the approach to a bottom-up focus on problems that are 
all related to each other, yet not in exactly the same way….”); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 
CALIFORNIA L REV 1087, 1129 (2002) (“[T]his Article advances as “approach” to understanding privacy 
rather than a definition or formula for privacy….My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top 
down because it conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts rather than in the abstract.”) [hereinafter, 
Conceptualizing Privacy]. 
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Some commentators have argued that it is not necessary to identify any one unifying 
theoretical framework for privacy in order to regulate it effectively.117  They suggest that 
if we can identify actual harms relating to privacy, this is a sufficient basis to formulate a 
regulatory framework.118  This may be the right approach, even if it is not theoretically 
satisfying or complete. 
 
This approach is also not as unusual as it might seem.  Many legal rights –notably 
intangible property rights - developed organically as the need arose.119  Trademarks, for 
example, developed to address the need to prevent unfair competition relating to false or 
misleading branding of goods or services.120  There is still some dispute as to whether 
trademarks are appropriately characterized as property rights as a matter of theory.121  
Nevertheless, the system still works in practice.  Trade secrets are another example where 
theoretical justifications are varied.122  Nevertheless, the system continues to function.  
Even Internet domain names have an uncertain legal status as property.123  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
117
  id.   
118
  id.  
119
  Of course, there are costs and benefits to this approach.  Organic development can fail to take into 
account the complex matrix of interests that need to be balanced, such as the need to balance free speech 
interests against property interests, and to distinguish different types of information speech and information 
property:  see, for example, discussion in Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note ___.  It is also 
possible that an organic approach might miss a critical period for regulatory decision-making after which 
regulations are difficult to implement and enforce, particularly if they would contradict entrenched social 
norms of behavior:  see Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion:  Genetic 
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONNECTICUT L REV 241 (2006) [hereinafter, Paradoxes]; 
Bernstein, New Technologies, supra note ___.  These articles are in reality advocating an approach that 
allows for some organic/incremental development while at the same time being sensitive to points at which 
legal regulation – or other regulatory approaches discussed in Part IV – are necessary. 
120
  LEXIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION DESKBOOK, § 1.01. 
121
  Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687, 
1693-1694 (1999) (noting in the context of United States law that it is very difficult to find a rationale to 
treat trademarks as a form of property).  This may be compared with jurisdictions like the United Kingdom 
and Australia where trademarks are explicitly defined as a form of personal property in the relevant 
legislation:  Trade Marks Act, U.K. § 2(1) (1994) (“A registered trade mark is a property right obtained by 
the registration of the trade mark under this Act and the proprietor of a registered mark has the rights and 
remedies provided by this Act.”); Trade Marks Act, Austl., § 21(1) (1995) (specifically defining a “trade 
mark” as a personal property right). 
122
  Jacqueline Lipton, Protecting Valuable Commercial Information in the Digital Age:  Law, Policy, 
and Practice, 6 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW AND POLICY 1, 9-15 (2001) (comparing the theoretical 
treatment of trade secrets in different jurisdictions, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) (full text available at:  http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol6/issue1/lipton.html, last viewed on 
July 24, 2008). 
123
  For example, in some contexts domain names have been regarded as a form of intangible personal 
property:  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (domain names treated as property for the 
purposes of California’s conversion law); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (allowing in rem proceedings against 
domain names as property in certain circumstances).  See also discussion in MILTON MUELLER, RULING 
THE ROOT:  INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE, 58-61 (2002) (discussing the 
nature of claims to property rights in domain names).  In other context, domain names are regarded as the 
object of a contractual license with a registering authority:  Network Solutions, Inc v Umbro International 
Inc, 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000) (domain names not regarded as a new form of property for the purpose of 
garnishment proceedings). 
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the domain name system continues to function, while market forces, social norms, and 
judicial and arbitral decisions124 iron out the underlying philosophical creases.   
 
Could privacy similarly emerge as an intangible property right over time?  
Property rights in information have always been contentious.125  They create concerns 
about chilling speech.126  Governments who create property rights in information must act 
to preserve the balance between those rights and speech.  This is a difficult task and is not 
always successfully achieved in practice.127  There is also the valid question as to why 
personal information should be regarded as property in the hands of its subject.   It is 
tempting to say that if something has value, as private information potentially does,128 it 
should be treated as property.  The problem with this reasoning is that much of the 
economic value in online information has been in text records in the hands of data 
aggregators.129  While there may be good reasons to create property in compilations of 
text records,130 it is not necessarily clear that personal information in the hands of the 
individual to whom it relates is a valuable commodity in its own right.131   
 
                                                 
124
  Arbitral decisions on domain names are actually very common under the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy incorporated by reference into many domain name contracts:  see 
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, last viewed on October 14, 2008. 
125
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of 
privacy); Litman, supra note ___, at 1288-1294 (describing various theories of private information as 
property). 
126
  Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295; Zimmerman, The Public Domain, supra note ___, at 310, 
348-9; Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note ___ (arguing that the increasing commodification of 
information potentially impinges on First Amendment freedoms).   
127
  In a federal system, the propertization of information can raise constitutional questions about 
which level of government has legislative competence to enact relevant laws.  Perhaps even more 
significantly, some have argued that no government may have constitutional competence to recognize or 
create property rights in factual personal information because of potential encroachments on First 
Amendment freedoms.  See discussion in SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, surpa note ___, at 129-
132 (describing problems in attempting to balance privacy torts with the idea of free speech); Diane 
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight:  A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L REV 291 (1983) (suggesting that torts prohibiting true speech cannot be reconciled with the 
First Amendment) [hereinafter, Requiem]; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN L REV 1049 
(2000) (suggesting that tortious approaches to protecting privacy cannot be reconciled with the First 
Amendment, but that contractual approaches may avoid this criticism); See Zimmerman, The Public 
Domain, supra note ___, at 298, 312, 366, 369 (arguing in favor of a mandatory public domain which may 
encroach on the government’s ability to create property rights that would interfere with the public domain 
of information and ideas). 
128
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, 78-100 (detailed attempt to ascribe various 
possible values to different aspects of privacy). 
129
  A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STANFORD L REV 1461, at 1502-3 (2000) 
(noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer’s hands is much less than the value of the aggregated 
data about many consumers in a data aggregator’s hands).  
130
  See, for example, Jerome Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Data?, 50 VAND L REV 51 (1997); Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies:  
Reconceptualizing Property Rights in Databases 18 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 773 (2003). 
131
  Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502-3 (noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer’s 
hands is much less than the value of the aggregated data about many consumers in a data aggregator’s 
hands). 
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Arguments have been made that property rights would give a data subject more 
control over the information in a transactional sense.132  However, if individuals have 
insufficient economic bargaining power against data aggregators, the existence of a 
property right in the hands of the individual will be of limited practical use.  In the OSN 
context, there is arguably even less need to recognize a property right to protect 
individual privacy in video images – at least if the justification for the property right is 
based on economic value and bargaining power.  This is because private individuals 
networking over OSNs are not likely doing so for transactional purposes that would 
justify or necessitate a property right in their personal information.133  Of course, not all 
property rights are justified on the basis of economic value.134  Many conceptions of 
property do rely on economic value.135  While value and property are often aligned, it is 
not necessarily the case that something must be commercially valuable to be property or 
that something must be property if it has a commercial value.136   
 
Putting economic value aside, property rights may be characterized by other 
attributes:  the ability to exclude others; the ability to enjoy an item free from 
interference; or, the ability to alienate or transfer rights whether or not for commercial 
value.137  These typical proprietary attributes are generally missing from personal 
information.  It would be difficult for an individual to function in society, particularly 
online, without leaving footprints involving disclosures of personal information.  Thus, 
there is no way of excluding others from personal information or of enjoying the 
information free from interference.  Sometimes information is required by others, as by 
                                                 
132
  Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves:  Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 
687 (2000) (“Simply put, if information about us is to be bought and sold, the initial purchase should be 
from us, since we are the ultimate content providers. If intangible property rights are rewards for the effort 
expended in creating the thing to be protected, we are entitled to ownership of our personal information.”) 
133
  There may be a justification for imputing a property right to the OSN provider in respect of its 
meta-collection of data on the grounds that OSN operators do utilize this data for commercial purposes.  
However, even that argument is tenuous in situations where an OSN does not transact with the data per se, 
but rather utilizes its vast user base as an incentive to attract advertisers.  This may be changing in practice.  
Recent attempts at social ad programs by some OSNs do utilize specific data about individuals and their 
online relationships with friends to better target advertising to their users:  William McGeveran, Facebook 
Inserting Users Into Ads, Info/Law, November 8, 2007 (available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/11/08/facebook-social-ads/, last viewed on July 24, 2008); 
Megan McCarthy, Facebook Ads Make You the Star – and You May Not Know It, Wired Blog Network, 
January 2, 2008 (available at http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/01/facebook-ads-ma.html, last viewed on 
July 24, 2008).   
134
  In fact, Professor Charles Fried implicitly accepted the proprietary nature of privacy in the context 
of interpersonal relationships where the privacy right would have no real economic value, but would have a 
social value:  Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 475, 487 (1968) (describing privacy as a 
form of “moral capital for personal relations” and referring to holding “title” to information about oneself). 
135
  LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK 
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, 19 (2004) (“But the “if value, then right” theory of creative 
property has never been America’s theory of creative property.  It has never taken hold within our law.”) 
[hereinafter, FREE CULTURE] 
136
  id.  An old dog-eared copy of a Shakespeare play, for example, may no longer have any economic 
value, but it will still be property.  On the other hand, a person’s time may be valuable, but it will not 
necessarily be property. 
137
  Courtney Tedrow, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L REV 
586, 591 (2000) (identifying classic property rights as including rights of exclusion, disposition, and use).   
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contract, to complete a purchase.138  Other times the information is incidentally observed 
as part of functioning in society: for example, if you go to the shops, people will see what 
you look like, an image of you may be captured on a security camera in a department 
store, etc.139  Online, individuals constantly leave digital footprints involving this kind of 
information.140   
 
Of course, advocates of property rights in personal information may argue that it 
is these very aspects of personal privacy that require a property label.  The necessity of 
transacting with this information on a daily basis requires that individuals be entitled to 
bargain for exchanges involving the information.141  However, this is a circular argument.  
It assumes that something should be labeled property because individuals are forced to 
disclose it, and therefore they should be compensated for doing so.142  Outside of property 
theory, there may be arguments based on autonomy and personhood for granting legal 
rights in personal information to a data subject.143  In attempts to explain the philosophical 
underpinnings of the right of publicity, which is derived from the right to privacy, 
commentators have suggested basing such rights in notions of autonomy and 
personhood.144  This is a possibility, but the theoretical contours of rights of personhood 
are unclear.145  In the end, this theory may not be any more useful than trying to pin down 
privacy as a form of property.  Ultimately, those who argue in favor of taking a bottom 
up approach to developing privacy regulation in the absence of one clear unifying theory 
probably have the right idea, at least for the present time.146  Privacy harms today are real 
                                                 
138
  For example, details of a credit card or postal address for payment or shipping purposes. 
139
  Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN L REV 1193, 1198 (1998). 
140
  id. 
141
  Bartow, supra note ___, at 704 (“Once I own my own data, I personally look forward to 
formulating a reverse “click-wrap” license, whereby any enterprise that wants me to visit its web site will 
have to agree to MY list of terms and conditions …”). 
142
  Maybe this could be justified on the basis of unjust enrichment.  In other words, data aggregating 
businesses are unjustly enriched by individuals if they can put together valuable consumer profiles using 
information “belonging to” consumers without compensating them for it.  However, this analysis also 
assumes the existence of an underlying property or quasi-property right in the plaintiff’s personal 
information, so it is again circular:  Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF L REV 1191, 1214 
(1995) (“Restitution can be seen as an aspect of the legal protection of property, and many instances of 
what the law characterizes as unjust enrichment might be described by saying that the defendant has 
received property of the plaintiff by means of a transfer that was legally ineffective to convey ownership.”) 
143
  Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note __, at 1116-1121 (discussion of personhood theories 
of privacy); Daniel Solove, ‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO LAW REVIEW 745, 760-1 (2007) (noting that many theories of privacy view the notion of privacy as 
an individual right related to protecting the individual’s personal dignity) [hereinafter, Nothing to Hide]; 
Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 7-8 (“[O]thers have defined privacy in terms of 
personhood, intimacy, and secrecy.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 29-34 
(critiquing “personhood” theories of privacy); Friend, supra note ___, at 483 (describing privcy as an 
“aspect of personal liberty”). 
144
  See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace:  A Personality Rights Paradigm for 
Personal Domain Name Disputes, forthcoming, 65 WASHINGTON & LEE LAW REVIEW 1445 (2008). 
145
  In the right of publicity context, see, for example, discussion in Mark McKenna, The Right of 
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225 (2005); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?  
The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 383 (1999). 
146
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not 
based upon any overarching principle.  We do not need overarching principles to understand and recognize 
problems …. If we focus on the problems, we can better understand and address them.  I aim to shift the 
Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video 
  24 
and observable, and the search for a single unifying theory may take too long to address 
the pressing needs facing online societies today.147   
 
C.  REGULATING SPECIFIC HARMS 
 
This reasoning perhaps leads logically to the question that if privacy harms are 
real and observable, why not redress specific harms rather than regulating to protect 
privacy more generally?  A number of commentators have suggested that the former 
approach is preferable, largely because of First Amendment concerns and because of the 
thought that attempting to regulate privacy online today is like locking the barn door after 
the horse has bolted.148  These commentators have suggested that the best approach to 
remedying privacy breaches in the twenty-first century is to focus on specific damages 
caused by leaks of personal information, including discrimination in the workplace, 
healthcare, and education.149  Indeed, some have suggested that the benefits of lack of 
privacy could theoretically outweigh the costs.150  Some have even argued that the wide-
scale dissemination of personal information is beneficial in that it can actually help the 
public to understand existing social norms.151  However, there is reason to be skeptical of 
an approach that fails to consider privacy as something worthy of protection in and of 
itself.  For one thing, many insecurities involving personal information do not result in 
specific damage.  Widespread unregulated online privacy incursions can create a general 
culture of unease where individuals cannot rely on anyone to respect personal 
boundaries.152   
 
While there are good reasons for the law to address specific harms that result from 
privacy breaches, such as dog poop girl’s loss of her job and Star Wars kid’s need for 
psychological treatment, this does not preclude the need to adopt some regulations that 
temper unbridled incursions into people’s privacy by means of digital video technologies.  
                                                                                                                                                 
approach to a bottom-up focus on problems that are all related to each other, yet not in exactly the same 
way.  If we study the problems together, we can better understand the entire cluster.”) 
147
  Bernstein, New Technologies, supra note ___. 
148
  Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems said famously in 1999:  “You have zero privacy.  Get 
over it.”:  Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy:  ‘Get Over It’, WIRED, January 26, 1999 (available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538, last viewed on July 25, 2008). 
149
  DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY:  WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 73-74; Strahilevitz, 
Reputation Nation, supra note ___ (arguing that basing decisions on real information rather than dangerous 
and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall). 
150
  Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note ___ (arguing that basing decisions on real information 
rather than dangerous and discriminatory proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall); 
Volokh, supra note ___, at 1120 (the government should not use privacy torts as a proxy for anti-
discrimination laws); DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY:  WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE USE TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998). 
151
  Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U CHI L REV 919, 928 (2005) 
(“[D]issemination [of personal information] can also help the public understand existing social norms.  
Indeed, gossip is often central in theories of social norm enforcement and change.”) 
152
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 97 (“[T]he invasion conception’s focus on 
privacy invasions as harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain privacy problems are 
structural – they affect not only particular individuals but society as a whole.”) 
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Some legislation has been developed to regulate intrusive digital video photography.153  
However, what is missing is regulation of online distributions of personally humiliating, 
embarrassing, or damaging images. 
 
D.  PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Of course, regulating privacy involves incursions on truthful expression.  This 
obviously runs up against the First Amendment.  Professors Zimmerman and Volokh 
have expressed concerns that privacy torts in particular are open to criticism as 
unconstitutional encroachments on First Amendment freedoms.154  These scholars would 
likely be unconvinced of arguments in favor of increasing the strength and scope of these 
torts in the online world.  However, that is not to say that there is no way of better 
protecting privacy online without damaging First Amendment freedoms.  Even First 
Amendment scholars have recognized other avenues for protecting privacy, including 
express and implied contracts of confidentiality, and extended breach of confidence 
actions.155  This article also relies on an expanded concept of regulation as a multi-modal 
enterprise that does not rely on legislation alone to protect privacy interests.  While the 
First Amendment aims to protect individual freedoms against government intrusions, it 
will generally allow societies to develop social norms, market forces, and technological 
solutions to perceived social problems.156  Thus, the only question remaining is how an 
effective multi-modal regulatory framework for digital video privacy might be 
developed, particularly given the global scope of online video privacy problems. 
 
 
IV.  A MULTI-MODAL APPROACH TO VIDEO PRIVACY  
 
There will be no single sweeping reform that will bestow privacy on each of us. 
 
- Professor Jon Mills157 
 
                                                 
153
  See, for example, Camera Phone Predator Alert bill, H.R. 414 (111th Cong., 2009); Cal. Civ. Code 
§1708.8(b) (“A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture, 
in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other 
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which 
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing 
device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical 
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device 
was used.”) 
154
  Volokh, supra note ___, at 1051 (“While privacy protection secured by contract is constitutionally 
sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free speech law.”); 1122 
(“restrictions on speech that reveals personal information are constitutional under current doctrine only if 
they are imposed by contract, express or implied”).  Professor Zimmerman has also argued against the 
constitutionality of privacy tort law on free speech grounds:  Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note ___. 
155
  See discussion in Part IV.A.5 infra. 
156
  For a contrasting view, see Dawn Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 
BERKELEY TECH L J 1115 (2005) (expressing concern that the increasing control of public forums for 
speech in private hands, such as OSN providers, will curtail meaningful First Amendment scrutiny and led 
to privacy and arbitrary decisions about what kinds of speech are available online). 
157
  MILLS, supra note ___, at 306. 
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The first and most important point to acknowledge about online video privacy 
regulation is that there is no one solution to digital age privacy problems158  However, this 
does not mean that it is futile to pursue enhanced privacy protections.  It simply means 
that regulation must be organic, adapting to societal needs as they develop.  It also means 
that we will likely need a more nuanced approach than simply relying on legislation and 
the courts.  Professor Lawrence Lessig famously identified four regulatory modalities that 
would be useful in cyberspace generally, and that would help to develop protections for 
online privacy in particular.159  These modalities comprised legal rules,160 social norms,161 
markets,162 and system architecture.163   
 
Social norms are similar to legal rules in that they threaten punishment for 
disobedience.164  However, they differ from laws in that punishments are imposed by 
communities, rather than government.165  Norms can be as effective, if not more effective, 
than legal rules.166  The informal penalties for violating norms, while often less severe 
than legal punishments, have a greater likelihood of being enforced than a legal rule in 
                                                 
158
  id. 
159
  Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VANDERBILT J ENT L & PRAC 56, 62-3 (1999) 
[hereinafter, The Architecture of Privacy]. 
160
  Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARVARD L REV 501, 
507 (1999) (“Law … orders people to behave in certain ways; it threatens punishment if they do not obey.  
The law tells me not to buy certain drugs, not to sell cigarettes without a license, and not to trade across 
international borders without first filing a customs form. It promises strict punishments if these orders are 
not followed. In this way, we say that law regulates.”) [hereinafter, The Law of the Horse]. 
161
  id. (“Norms control where I can smoke; they affect how I behave with members of the opposite 
sex; they limit what I may wear; they influence whether I will pay my taxes. Like law, norms regulate by 
threatening punishment ex post. But unlike law, the punishments of norms are not centralized. Norms are 
enforced (if at all) by a community, not by a government. In this way, norms constrain, and therefore 
regulate.”).  Not all norms will threaten punishment for disobedience.  Some norms can be maintained 
without any penalty for violation:  Strandburg, supra note___, at 1246-9 (“coordination norms” can be 
maintained without imposing sanctions for noncompliance because individuals have no incentive to deviate 
from norms that depend on a large group of people performing the same action in the same way; “epistemic 
norms” do not require sanctions because individuals conform to these norms as a means of economizing 
information costs so there is no incentive for others to enforce the norms against individuals). 
162
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra, note ___, at 507 (“Markets, too, regulate. They regulate by 
price. The price of gasoline limits the amount one drives - more so in Europe than in the United States. The 
price of subway tickets affects the use of public transportation - more so in Europe than in the United 
States.”) 
163
  id., at 507-509 (“[T]here is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior - "architecture." 
By "architecture" I mean the physical world as we find it, even if "as we find it" is simply how it has 
already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods limits the extent to which the 
neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily accessible with a diversity of shops, increases the 
integration of residents in that town. That Paris has large boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to 
protest.  That the Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the 
influence of one branch of government over the other. These constraints function in a way that shapes 
behavior. In this way, they too regulate.”) 
164
  id, at 507.  Subsequent literature has demonstrated that norms are actually more complex than this, 
and that there are various different kinds of norms that operate in different ways:  Strandburg, supra note 
___.  However, for the purposes of this discussion, Lessig’s definition will suffice. 
165
  id. 
166
  Strandburg, supra note ___, at 1248 (“Social norms often play a more important role than legal 
regulation.”) 
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many contexts.167  Markets regulate by imposing price constraints on certain behaviors.168  
One example in the privacy context would be where online firms charge more to 
consumers for providing greater assurances of personal privacy.169  Architecture, on the 
other hand, regulates by physically constraining certain behaviors.170  In the real world, 
for example, the erection of a border fence may constrain illegal immigration.171  The 
cyberspace analog to physical world architecture is system architecture or “code”.172   
 
None of these modalities operates in a vacuum.  Their interaction facilitates given 
behaviors.173  Additionally, these modalities are not comprehensive.  There are other 
modalities that usefully regulate online conduct.  Thus, we might also recognize 
modalities such as public education,174 and, private/non-profit institutions.175  The 
institutions comprised in the latter category might include OSNs themselves, but perhaps 
more to the point, public interest organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
                                                 
167
  id, (“When social norms are feasible they can be quite effective.  Though the informal penalties 
for violating social norms may be less severe than the penalties available under the law, the likelihood of 
being penalized may be quite high.”). 
168
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra, note ___, at 507. 
169
  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 62.  Of course, Professor Lessig here may 
have been contemplating privacy protections for posters customers of service providers who are more 
likely to be posters of private information than victims of unauthorized postings of private information by 
others.  However, this would depend upon the scope and nature of the privacy policy promulgated by a 
given online service provider.  Where an online service provider offered to protect privacy of both posters 
and subjects of information and images, more people may be drawn to that service provider because of the 
signals the service provider gives about being a generally good online corporate citizen.  Some online 
service providers do currently at least purport to protect the privacy of third parties as well as their own 
customers – see discussion of relevant terms of use in Parts II.B and IV.A.5. 
170
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 507-508. 
171
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 98-99 (giving examples of ways in which 
physical architectures can constrain behavior); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 122 (2004) (“A 
fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across a river.  Railroad tracks might constrain the ability 
of a community to integrate its social life.  As with the market, architecture does not effect its constraint 
through ex post punishments.  Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects its constraint through 
simultaneous conditions.”). 
172
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 509 (“[T]he architecture of cyberspace, or its 
code, regulates behavior in cyberspace. The code, or the software and hardware that make cyberspace the 
way it is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave.”) 
173
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra, note ___, at 123 (“[T]he first point about these four modalities of 
regulation is obvious:  They interact.  Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by another.  Or 
restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.”).  See also Froomkin, supra note ___, 1466 
(“While there may be no single tactic that suffices to preserve the status quo, much less regain lost privacy, 
a smorgasbord of creative technical and legal approaches could make a meaningful stand against what 
otherwise seems inevitable.”); Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 511-534; Lessig, The 
Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 63-64 (suggesting a combined arhictecture/market solution to 
protecting privacy online, that relies in part on use of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) designed 
by the World Wide Web Consortium). 
174
  Lilian Edwards and Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking:  Irreconcilable Ideas?, at 
___  in ANDREA M MATWYSHYN (ed), HARBORING DATA:  INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND THE 
CORPORATION, forthcoming, 2008; SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203-204. 
175
  Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note ___, at 33 (discussing the American Libraries 
Association’s role of protecting patron’s rights and freedoms in the library bill of rights in 1939 as an 
example of an institution playing a regulatory role in promoting individual privacy).   
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(EFF)176, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),177 and perhaps also academic 
institutions.178  The remainder of this Part identifies the key features of each of these six 
modalities, and ways in which they might interact to provide more effective protections 
for online privacy.   
 
A.  LEGAL RULES 
 
1. The Role of Law Online 
 
[L]egal rules … play a large part in establishing the social context of privacy …. 
[P]rivacy is not just an absence of information abroad about ourselves; it is a feeling of 
security in control over that information.  By using the public, impersonal and ultimate 
institution of law to grant persons this control, we at once put the right to control as far 
beyond question as we can and at the same time show how seriously we take that right. 
 
- Professor Charles Fried179 
 
Lawyers have a tendency to regard legal rules as the paramount – and sometimes 
the only – solution to a problem.180  However, laws have limits, especially online.  In 
particular, effective enforcement mechanisms can be problematic where harmful conduct 
involves anonymous wrongdoers who could be situated anywhere in the world.  
Additionally, legislatures are often faced with complex policy choices in balancing 
competing interests such as privacy, speech, and intellectual property rights online.  The 
novelty of much online conduct can exacerbate these difficulties.  Governments often 
look to social norms to discern an appropriate policy basis for new laws.  In areas like 
online social networking, where many social norms are not fully developed, governments 
may have difficulty identifying appropriate directions for new laws.181  The legislature is 
then faced with questions as to whether it should attempt to create and communicate new 
norms through its laws, or to wait and see what norms develop before legislating. 
 
                                                 
176
  The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes itself as:  “leading civil liberties group defending 
your rights in the digital world.” (see www.eff.org, last viewed on July 23, 2008). 
177
  The Electronic Privacy Information Center describes itself as:  “a public interest research center in 
Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and 
to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.” (see www.epic.org, last viewed on July 
23, 2008).  The identification of new forms of regulatory modality is not inconsistent with Professor 
Lessig’s work – he did not intend for his four regulatory modalities to be the last word on cyberspace 
regulation:  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 123 (“Whether or not there are other constraints 
(there may well be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most 
significant…”). 
178
  See discussion in Part IV.F infra. 
179
  Fried, surpa note ___, at 493. 
180
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121 (“Law is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers at 
least).”) 
181
  In contrast to this, some have argued that it is necessary for decision-makers, including 
legislatures often to consider acting before social norms have developed because failure to do so may result 
in an inability to effectively regulate inconsistently with norms where the need arises:  Bernstein, New 
Technologies, supra note ___, at 943-946 (including a discussion of entrenchment of anti-privacy norms on 
the Internet in the context of electronic commerce). 
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Legal rules are therefore unlikely to be the answer to online video privacy 
problems.182  They will have an important place183 in the regulatory matrix, but they 
cannot resolve online privacy issues on their own.  The challenge for regulators will be to 
identify exactly what role legal rules should play, and how those rules should interact 
with other forms of regulation.  Recently, commentators have suggested that online 
privacy regulation could be improved if law:  recognized privacy in public;184 better 
protected confidential relationships;185 and allowed individuals to exercise greater control 
over their personal information after it has been exposed to other people or even to the 
general public.186  Various approaches to legal regulation might prove fruitful in the video 
privacy context.  Privacy law might usefully draw on some of the lessons learned from 
digital copyright law and environmental regulation.  Additionally, privacy torts could be 
updated to better protect online video privacy.  Law might also promote contractual and 
technological solutions to online video privacy problems.  The following discussion 
considers each of these possibilities in turn. 
 
2. Lessons from Digital Copyright Law 
 
The case for drawing ideas from copyright law should not be overstated because 
of concerns that copyright law has over-propertized online information in the digital 
age.187  Nevertheless, there are some salient parallels between online privacy and the 
protection of copyright works online.188  Copyright law has been very successful in 
protecting copyrights in online video files despite early concerns about the ability of 
copyright holders to exercise control over information in digital formats.189  Thus, the 
copyright model counters the argument that it is impossible to regulate video files online 
on the grounds that it is too difficult to obtain effective control over these files.190  
                                                 
182
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 193 (“There is … a limit to how much 
the law can do.  The law is an instrument capable of subtle notes, but it is not quite a violin.”) 
183
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 123 (“While these four modalities are analytically 
independent, law has a special role in affecting the three.  The law, in other words, sometimes operates to 
increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.”) 
184
  id, at 187.  Professor Sánchez Abril has also noted that, while many traditional privacy laws are 
premised on a distinction between public and private conduct, this distinction has become increasingly 
blurred in the digital information age, which has caused expectations of privacy to become unstable and 
difficult to ascertain:  Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note ___, at 5-6.  See also ZITTRAIN, supra 
note ___, at 212 (“Even the use of “public” and “private” to describe our selves and spaces is not subtle 
enough to express the kind of privacy we might want [online].”), 216 (“Peer-leveraging technologies are 
overstepping the boundaries that laws and norms have defined as public and private, even as they are also 
facilitating beneficial innovation.”). 
185
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 187.  See Richards and Solove, Privacy’s 
Other Path, supra note ___. 
186
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 188. 
187
  Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED (Jan. 1996) (available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html, last viewed on July 23, 2008); LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE, supra note ___. 
188
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 185. 
189
  id, at 184-186. 
190
  id., at 184 ([I]s control over information really feasible?  If we expose information to others, isn’t 
it too difficult for the law to allow us still to control it?  Perhaps the law is reticent about granting control 
because of the practical difficulties.  Information spreads rapidly, sometimes like a virus, and it is not easily 
contained.”) 
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Copyright law will apply online regardless of whether the relevant information has been 
accidentally exposed to the public,191 and even if the information is in a digital format that 
can be readily copied.192  Thus, it is technically possible to enact a law that controls the 
flow of video information online. 
 
The similarities between copyright and privacy with respect to video files include 
questions about:  (a) how to effectively control access to, and use of, digitally available 
information; (b) how to balance the rights of an information rights holder against 
competing interests such as free speech and other legitimate uses;193 (c) what kinds of 
liability, if any, should be faced by Internet intermediaries, such as Internet service 
providers, for unauthorized activities of others;194 (d) how to identify appropriate forums 
for dispute resolution in a global information society; (e) how to deal with global 
disharmonization of relevant legal principles;195 (f) how to identify wrongdoers in a 
largely anonymous online medium;196 and, (g) how to provide effective remedies for 
harms arising from the viral online dissemination of protected information.197   
 
Copyright law has also developed a notice and takedown regime to give rights-
holders the ability to request removal of infringing material from websites.198  This law 
also provides a safe harbor from secondary infringement liability for Internet 
                                                 
191
  id, at 185 (“The copyright system focuses on the use of information – it allows certain uses and 
prohibits others.  And it does so regardless of whether the information has been publicly exposed.”) 
192
  id. (“[C]opyright law provides protection even when a work can be readily copied.  I don’t have to 
take any steps to protect my work.”) 
193
  Legitimate uses might include those traditionally associated with copyright law such as news 
reporting on matters of public interest, and some non profit educational uses.  In the privacy context, 
certain kinds of data aggregation might also be legitimate uses if appropriate safeguards against 
unauthorized privacy invasions are implemented.  See, for example, Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) 
(upholding law requiring computerized data aggregation of information relating to prescription of certain 
medications, and acknowledging that appropriate information security safeguards were in place). 
194
  Professor Solove notes that copyright law provides liability when third parties facilitate a 
copyright violation:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 185. 
195
  For example, the European Union and United States take very different approaches to privacy.  
The European Union approach is largely codified in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (the “Data Protection Directive”).  The United States, on the 
other hand, takes a more piecemeal approach to private data protection:  RAYMOND KU AND JACQUELINE 
LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS, 544 (2 ed, 2006) (“[T]o date, the United States 
largely relies upon unfair and deceptive business practice law and self-regulation [to protect privacy].  In 
contrast, other nations, and most notably, the European Union have taken more aggressive steps to protect 
individual privacy in data collection.”) 
196
  17 U.S.C. § 512 allows copyright holders, for example, to seek identifying information about 
alleged copyright infringers from third party services providers.  See also In re Verizon Internet Services, 
Inc, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (Internet service provider (“ISP”) challenging subpoena served on 
it by the Recording Industry Association of America seeking identifying information for alleged copyright 
infringers utilizing the ISP’s services.)  
197
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184-5 (noting that copyright law will 
provide remedies even when information has been exposed to public view and has not been protected by 
the information holder against potential viral distribution). 
198
  17 U.S.C. 512 (c). 
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intermediaries such as OSNs.199  The notice and takedown idea could be extended to the 
privacy context if personal privacy rights are to be strengthened in digital video images.  
Of course, such an approach would have to take into account the potential chilling impact 
on free speech.  Safeguards would need to be built into the system to ensure that the 
notice and takedown mechanism was not used frivolously to the detriment of online 
expression.  However, there would likely be less risk of frivolous takedown notices in the 
privacy context, involving private individuals’ reputations, than in the copyright context 
where powerful corporate copyright holders seem to resort to the takedown regime even 
in the absence of a serious likelihood that a copyright infringement has occurred.200 
 
Although digital copyright law may be a useful model for enhanced online 
privacy protections, it needs to be kept in mind that parallels between copyright and 
privacy are not perfect.  The constitutional underpinnings for copyrights and privacy are 
quite different.  Copyright law has clear and express origins in the federal Constitution,201 
while informational privacy does not.202  Thus, the online protection of copyrights by 
Congress is more easily justified in the face of First Amendment concerns than the 
protection of privacy.  Additionally, copyright law in the digital age has created its own 
imbalances,203 and these should be avoided in enhancing any legal protections for online 
privacy.204   
 
3. Lessons from Environmental Regulation 
 
Environmental regulation is another area of law that may prove instructive for 
online privacy, at least with respect to the role that OSN providers might play.  There has 
                                                 
199
  id.  The privacy analog to this would be § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 
effectively immunizing ISPs for tort liability for speech posted by others utilizing their services. 
200
  See, for example, discussion in Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling 
Effects”?  Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006); MICHELE BOLDRIN and DAVID K LEVINE, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, 108-110 (2008) (describing abuses of notice and takedown procedure by 
powerful corporate copyright holders). 
201
  Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8 (granting the Congress power:  “To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”) 
202
  Limited privacy rights have been implied into various constitutional clauses, but there is no 
express grant of power for Congress to protect privacy:  DANIEL SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG AND PAUL 
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2 ed, 2006) (“Although the United States Constitution does not 
specifically mention privacy, it has a number of provisions that protect privacy, and it has been interpreted 
as providing a right to privacy.”) 
203
  Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED (Jan. 1996) (available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html, last viewed on July 23, 2008); LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE, supra note ___; BOLDRIN and LEVINE, supra note ___, at 108-120. 
204
  Of course even digital copyright law has been bolstered in many respects by contract law and 
technical standards:  Michael Madison, Legal-Ware:  Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 
FORDHAM L REV 1025 (1998) (discussing uses of contractual and technological measures with copyright 
law in attempts by copyright holders to protect their rights online).  This is another example of an important 
and necessary interaction between distinct regulatory modalities – contract, architecture (technology) and 
law.  Privacy law advocates considering these interactions today have an opportunity to achieve a better 
balance of interests in the wake of some of the arguable failures of digital copyright law. 
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been a growing trend in information privacy law to look to models of environmental 
regulation as a basis for ascertaining best practices for online privacy.205  Commentators 
have noted the ways in which environmental law has moved away from command and 
control models206 towards second generation initiatives that encourage regulated parties 
to choose for themselves the means by which they will achieve regulatory goals.207  
These approaches could be adapted to online privacy.208  In effect, law can be utilized as 
a means to foster the development of market forces that promote the kinds of privacy 
goals society would ideally require online.  Laws could set goals of best practices for 
OSNs in protecting and enforcing individual privacy in terms of things like the drafting 
and enforcement of their terms of use and privacy policies, and their willingness to 
incorporate privacy-enhancing technologies into their services.209  Here, we potentially 
see a complex interplay of social norms, laws, market forces, and system architecture in 
achieving desired privacy outcomes.    
 
4. Privacy and Publicity Torts 
 
Privacy torts seem to be the most obvious approach to the legal regulation of 
online privacy.  However, as currently framed, they have significant limitations, most of 
which have been identified above.210  The Restatement (Second) of Torts currently 
recognizes four distinct privacy torts.211  Unfortunately, they are uncohesive in terms of 
coverage and have been criticized by free speech advocates.212  Nevertheless, some of the 
privacy torts could be modified to better accommodate the realities of online conduct 
involving video content.  Professor Sánchez Abril has suggested strengthening the tort 
relating to public disclosure of private facts213 to operate more effectively in the OSN 
                                                 
205
  Dennis D Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment:  What Privacy Regulation can Learn from 
Environmental Law, 41 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006); Deirdre Mulligan and Joseph Simitian, Assessing 
Security Breach Notification Laws, work in progress, copy on file with the author. 
206
  Hirsch, supra note ___, at 8; Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 
NOTRE DAME L REV 313, 320 (2006) (explaining command and control regulatory approach in the 
environmental context as a government setting a particular standard with which targeted actors are required 
to comply 
207
  Hirsch, supra note ___, at 8. 
208
  id., at 23 (“The privacy injuries of the Information Age are structurally similar to the 
environmental damage of the smokestack era.  Two key concepts that have bee used to understand 
environmental damage – the “negative externality” and the “tragedy of the commons” – also shed light on 
privacy issues.”); 63 (identifying other similarities between environmental regulation and information 
regulation, including the fact that market players regulated by both areas of law: “undergo rapid change, 
face stiff competition, and have the capacity for socially beneficial innovation.”) 
209
  The kinds of technologies that might be incorporated into OSN services in this respect are taken 
up in more detail in Part IV.A.6 infra. 
210
  See discussion in Part II.A.2 supra. 
211
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 652A-E (1997). 
212
  Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note ___ (suggesting that torts prohibiting true speech cannot be 
reconciled with the First Amendment); Volokh, supra note ___ (suggesting that tortious approaches to 
protecting privacy cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment, but that contractual approaches may 
avoid this criticism). 
213
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the 
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to 
the public.”) 
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context.214  She notes that the public disclosure tort developed at a time when the law was 
concerned with intrusions into physical spaces.215  It is therefore not well suited to virtual 
environments.216  She suggests re-focusing enquiries about public versus private 
activities, in the context of this tort, to better meet the needs of the information society.  
Notably, she advocates:  (a) thinking about zones of confidentiality created by system 
architecture, agreements and relationship bonds, rather than physical walls;217 (b) 
categorizing privacy harms that ensue from information disclosure rather than 
categorizing certain subject matter as per se private;218 and (c) thinking in terms of 
overall accessibility of online information rather than in terms of whether it was 
completely secret or secluded.219 
 
Related to the privacy torts is the right of publicity tort.  In fact, the publicity tort 
closely tracks one of the privacy torts – the misappropriation tort.220  Both torts prevent 
the use of someone else’s name or likeness for financial benefit.221  Thus, neither tort 
effectively covers unauthorized posting and dissemination of photographs on OSNs.  
Most of these uses are not for commercial gain, but merely for amusement and 
discussion.222  The misappropriation-based torts might be expanded to help individuals 
control uses and dissemination of their images online:223 for example, they could cover 
unauthorized disseminations of an individual’s image even in the absence of a profit 
motive.  Of course, there would have to be some counterbalancing forces put in place to 
ensure that speech was not unnecessarily chilled:  for example, a broadened non-
commercial appropriation tort might apply online only “when people’s photos are used in 
ways that are not of public concern.”224   
 
The four American privacy torts also suffer from some common limitations.  
Plaintiffs are put in the awkward position of having to relive the humiliation and 
embarrassment of the images as they are entered into the public record as part of the court 
                                                 
214
  Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy, supra note __. 
215
  id, at 2 (“[P]rivacy is usually a function of the physical space in which the purportedly private 
activity occurred.”); 3 (“Traditionally, privacy has been inextricably linked to physical space.”) 
216
  id, at 4 (concepts of physical space are no longer relevant in analyzing modern online privacy 
harms). 
217
  id., at 47. 
218
  id. 
219
  id. 
220
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name 
or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”) 
221
  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an 
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal 
characteristics.”).  See also MILLS, supra note ___, at 173-177 (discussing technical differences between 
the privacy misappropriation tort and the right of publicity tort). 
222
  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1]. (“The appropriation tort would rarely 
apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private lives or the posting of their photos.”)  Of course, 
it is arguable that the OSN provider’s complicity in the posting might amount to financial profit motives if 
the OSN provider is deriving financial profit from advertising related to the online posting of video content.  
This proposition remains to be tested. 
223
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort might be 
expanded to encompass a broader set of problematic uses of information about a person …”) 
224
  id. 
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proceedings.225  To add insult to injury, the plaintiff will have to pay a lawyer for the 
privilege of reliving this embarrassment.  Additionally, domestic laws will always raise 
jurisdictional difficulties online, as compared with, say, technological solutions or 
contracts that specify choice of forum and choice of law.226 
 
5. Privacy Contracts and Breach of Confidence Actions 
 
Express or implied contracts and breach of confidence actions might also assist in 
the video privacy context.  These issues are treated together here because they all rely on 
relationships.  Express or implied contracts arise from the conduct of the parties and their 
intention to enter into legally binding obligations.  Breach of confidence actions can arise 
from contract law or can be imposed externally to protect a relationship that the law 
deems to require a high duty of confidentiality.  Examples are the doctor-patient 
relationship and the preacher-penitent relationship.227  Relationships that give rise to legal 
obligations of confidence can be useful models for privacy regulation.228  However, peer-
based video privacy incursions do not generally involve relationships that the law would 
today regard as involving legal obligations of confidence.  Of course, it is possible to 
expand the categories of confidential relationships recognized by the law.  The question 
would be how best to achieve this.  Express contracts of confidentiality might be 
problematic.  It is unlikely that private individuals taking pictures of each other and 
posting them online have the time, inclination, or experience to enter into contracts to 
protect each other’s privacy.  However, implied contracts recognized by the legal system 
might be a viable alternative.   
 
Commentators have recognized that implied contracts, and even express 
contracts, can be utilized in interpersonal relationships for legal enforcement of privacy 
and confidentiality expectations online.229  Professors Sánchez Abril and Cava have 
suggested that an express promise of confidentiality between private individuals in 
                                                 
225
  MILLS, supra note ___, at 53-4 (describing additional privacy problems raised by the availability 
of court records on the Internet). 
226
  Such contracts are generally upheld in the online context.  See, for example, Caspi v The 
Microsoft Network, 323 N.J. Sup. 118 (App. Div. 1999). 
227
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 214 (giving examples of relationships of 
confidence protected by legal rules, including attorney/client, priest/penitent, husband/wife, and, 
psychotherapist/patient). 
228
  As early as 1968, for example, Professor Charles Fried noted the importance of focusing on 
privacy expectations within personal relationships:  Fried, supra note ___, at 482 (“In general it is my 
thesis that in developed social contexts love, friendship and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and 
accord to each other a certain measure of privacy.”) 
229
  See Abril and Cava, supra note ___, at 268 (“Online, express confidentiality agreements are a 
more tenable solution. Facilitated through available technology, confidentiality agreements between users 
could assure a higher level of protection for those sharing private and personal information. In some 
instances, confidentiality agreements have been offered through online health ISPs as a prerequisite to 
membership. PatientsLikeMe.com includes such a clause as part of its terms of use. It states:  “You agree 
not to disclose to any person or entity personally identifiable information about other members that you 
learn using this Site (whether posted in the Member Area by a member or emailed to you by a member) 
without the express consent of such member. You may disclose information of a general nature (that could 
not identify the member who provided such information or whom such information is about) to third parties 
outside this Site, subject to the above restriction on non-commercial use.”). 
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respect of health care information could be built into online health care architectures.230  
Professor McClurg has suggested the development of implied contracts of confidentiality 
for intimate relationships generally.231  His suggestion contemplates protection for both 
textual information shared in confidence and for video information pertaining to the 
relationship.232  His ideas could be extended to social relationships more broadly.   
 
Professor Volokh suggests that express or implied contracts of confidentiality are 
the only legal method of avoiding First Amendment problems.233  However, he identifies 
two important limitations on contract-based solutions that may have particular resonance 
in cyberspace.  The first is that contractual enforcement will generally not apply to third 
parties, unless, for example, the third party can be found to be an agent of one of the 
contracting parties.234  In the OSN situation, people disseminating each other’s images 
online may not be in any kind of relationship with an image subject let alone a 
contractual relationship.  The second limitation of contractual solutions is that contracts 
cannot be enforced against minors.235  This may be a significant problem in the OSN 
context because presumably many people sharing images online are minors.   
 
Some commentators have suggested the extension of breach of confidence actions 
to better protect privacy.236  For example, British law currently protects a greater array of 
relationships of confidence than American law.237  American tort law could be extended 
to cover a greater variety of relationships of confidence, particularly online.  Such an 
approach may again be less objectionable on First Amendment grounds than reliance on 
extending privacy torts because rights arising from relationships are not enforceable 
against the whole world.238  Of course, one limitation of the breach of confidence 
                                                 
230
  id, at 276 (“Cyber-patients have the duty of confidentiality to fellow patients. All information 
disclosed on health networking websites is privy and not to be divulged or otherwise disseminated. Users 
should not disclose any information obtained through the website unless specifically authorized. Similarly, 
disclosing cyber-patients should be as clear as possible regarding the level of confidentiality they expect. 
Cyber-patients have the duty to obtain the consent of family members and others whose health information 
they disclose. Relevant information regarding the health of family members is a vital part of a complete 
medical record. However, cyber-patients must understand these individuals also have rights to privacy in 
their health information. Cyber-patients must, therefore, obtain the informed consent of their family 
members before posting such information on the website.”). 
231
  McClurg, supra note ___. 
232
  id., at 887-888 (giving examples of online text-based and video disseminations of confidential 
information). 
233
  Volokh, supra note ___, at 1062 (“I certainly do not claim that a contractual approach to 
information privacy, even with a large dollop of implied contract, is a panacea for information privacy 
advocates …. I claim only that contractual solutions are a constitutional alternative and may be the only 
constitutional alternative, not that they are always a particularly satisfactory alternative.”); Zimmerman, 
Requiem, supra note ___, at 363 (suggesting looking into contractual solutions for protecting privacy rather 
than tort law). 
234
  Volokh, supra note ___, at 1061. 
235
  id., at 1063. 
236
  Richards and Solove, Privacy’s Other Path, supra note ___.  
237
  id., at 158-160 (2007); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 137 (“England, 
which rejects Warren and Brandeis’s privacy torts, recognizes a breach-of-confidence tort.  Unlike the 
American version, which applies only in a few narrow contexts, the English tort applies much more 
generally and extends even to spouses and lovers.”) 
238
  Richards and Solove, Privacy’s Other Path, supra note ___178-181. 
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approach is that, even a broadened concept of relationships of confidence will not cover 
situations such as dog poop girl and Bus Uncle where there is no relationship at all 
between the image taker and the image subject, other than that they happen to be sharing 
a mode of public transportation. 
 
6. Legislating Codes of Conduct and Technical Standards 
 
Legal rules might also enhance privacy by encouraging the adoption of certain 
social behaviors and technical standards.239  Here, we are talking about legislating best 
practices to encourage either markets or individuals, or both, to behave in a particular 
way to better protect online privacy.  Legislation might be targeted at OSNs with respect 
to best practices for default privacy settings.240  This might involve requiring OSNs to 
incorporate technological privacy protections by default, such as refusing access by one 
user to another’s information without asking the second user a series of security questions 
and having her check a permissions screen.241  Another example would be requiring 
OSNs to set their systems to prevent copying and pasting of digital information and 
images unless a particular user opted to allow her images to be copied by others.242   
 
Legal rules do not only shape behavior through enforcement – or the threat of 
enforcement.  They also serve a communicative function about appropriate online 
conduct.243  They can thus reflect, and in some cases even direct, the development of 
social norms.  In the video privacy context, law will be an important piece of the 
regulatory matrix both by punishing inappropriate behaviors, and by signaling the 
contours of acceptable behaviors.  However, law cannot operate in a vacuum.  The 
following discussion considers the other five regulatory modalities that must interact with 
law to achieve an effective regulatory matrix.    
                                                 
239
  This is an extension of the idea of drawing on the environmental regulation model to encourage 
markets, and in this case individuals as well, to behave in a particular way. 
240
  Edwards and Brown, supra note ___ (Drawing on the experience of the Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications in the European Union - Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector (available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_201/l_20120020731en00370047.pdf, last viewed on July 24, 2008) – 
Professors Edwards and Brown suggest that legislating mandatory privacy default settings may prove more 
effective in protecting individual privacy than leaving the market to its own devices.) 
241
  This is effectively what many closed networks do now.  Facebook, for example, does not let a user 
access another’s profile unless the second user accepts the first as a “friend”. 
242
  Of course, for privacy protection purposes, this would require permission of the image subject as 
well as potentially the image owner which could be technically unwieldy in practice. 
243
  See, for example, Fried, supra note ___, at 493 (“By using the public, impersonal and ultimate 
institution of law to grant persons this control, we at once put the right to control as far beyond question as 
we can and at the same time show how seriously we take that right.”) 
Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video 
  37 
B.  SOCIAL NORMS 
 
Social norms are an extremely important form of regulation.244  Norms may be 
defined as rules that are:  “diffusely enforced by third parties other than state agents by 
means of social sanctions.”245  Norms can be more significant than laws,246 particularly in 
areas that involve high levels of social interaction,247 like privacy.  The problem with 
cyberspace is that many norms are not yet well developed.  Particularly in relation to 
OSNs, norm development is in its infancy because of the relative novelty of social 
networking technology.  This state of affairs contains both advantages and disadvantages 
for privacy advocates.  Advantages include the ability to make privacy-protecting 
regulatory decisions before privacy-destroying norms become entrenched.  However, 
disadvantages include the difficulties of ascertaining appropriate levels of privacy 
protection in the absence of clearer information about social expectations.  This paradox 
is not new in the online privacy context.248  However, it requires serious thought by 
decision-makers before potentially harmful norms become entrenched.249 
 
Globalization also raises difficulties of identifying and enforcing norms online.  
Are we talking about one global society’s norms?  Or rather an overlapping group of 
online societies, like the overlapping networks of “friends” on an OSN?  Yet another 
problem of identifying privacy norms online relates to the ambiguity or cognitive 
disconnect that arises when people are surveyed about online privacy.  In the few surveys 
that have been conducted on attitudes to online privacy, respondents generally rate the 
idea of privacy in the abstract very highly.250  However, they are prepared to bargain with 
their privacy for a very small price.251  An online shopping coupon may well entice an 
individual to disclose voluminous personal details with little regard to future uses of that 
information.252 
                                                 
244
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 93 (“One of the primary ways that society 
intervenes in people’s lives is through the enforcement of norms.”) 
245
  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 62 (“[Norms] are different from law – they 
are enforced … not by the state, but by the sanctions of other members of a particular community.  But they 
are nonetheless a source of constraint, functioning to protect privacy.”) 
246
  Strandburg, supra note ___, at 1248.  
247
  id. 
248
  See discussion in Bernstein, New Technologies, supra note ___ (describing similar dynamics with 
respect to commercial transactions on the Internet and data aggregation by Internet commerce companies). 
249
  id. 
250
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 73 (citing the work of economists 
Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags); Eric Goldman, On My Mind:  The Privacy Hoax, available at 
http://www.ericgoldman.org/Articles/privacyhoax.htm, last viewed on July 24, 2008 (“But what do these 
surveys really prove? Consumers may tell survey takers they fear for their privacy, but their behavior belies 
it. People don't read privacy policies, for example. In a survey taken last year by the Privacy Leadership 
Initiative, a group of corporate and trade association executives, only 3% of consumers read privacy 
policies carefully, and 64% only glanced at--or never read--privacy policies.”).   
251
  id.  
252
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 87 (“Since people routinely give out their 
personal information for shopping discount cards, for access to websites, and even for free, some market 
proponents (especially the self-regulators) argue that the value of the data is very low to the individuals.”); 
Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502 (“[C]onsumers suffer from privacy myopia:  they will sell their data too 
often and too cheaply.  Modest assumptions about consumer privacy myopia suggest that even Americans 
who place a high value on information privacy will sell their privacy bit by bit for frequent flyer miles.”)   
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So how do we identify and enforce social norms as they relate to content, 
particularly video content, shared over OSNs?  Some empirical work may be helpful, 
although to date empirical work has had its limits because individuals typically 
undervalue their personal information.253  There is an argument that empirical work may 
suffer less from this problem in the OSN context than in the textual data aggregation 
context.  In the latter context, where much of the survey work has been done so far, 
consumers’ abstract expectations of privacy are often not aligned with their behavior 
when faced with the choice of trading their information for some minor commercial 
benefit, such as online shopping coupons or frequent flyer miles.  In the online video 
context, on the other hand, there is little prospect of individuals bargaining with their 
personal information for any commercial benefit because their transactions are generally 
social rather than commercial.  Thus, self-reported survey results about privacy 
expectations in OSNs may be more appropriately aligned with the way people actually 
behave.  Another possible method of identifying emerging privacy norms online is to 
consider blog postings and associated comments that deal with privacy issues.  More and 
more often, online privacy incursions are reported on blogs, and various individuals will 
comment about related expectations of privacy.254  A comprehensive survey of some of 
these postings may illuminate prevailing societal views about privacy, and identify areas 
in which norms are still developing. 
 
If it is possible to ascertain any social expectations about online privacy in the 
OSN context, these could usefully be reduced to Internet guidelines, akin to the way that 
netiquette developed in the early days of the Internet.  Netiquette has been defined as “the 
growing body of acceptable, though as yet largely unwritten, etiquette with respect to 
conduct by users of the Internet”.255  In the early days of the Internet, netiquette generally 
referred to attempts to articulate appropriate social norms with respect to the new email 
technologies available at the time.256   
 
Private organizations or individuals who may have a stake in the future operation 
of OSNs might encourage the articulation of netiquette principles for OSNs that take 
                                                                                                                                                 
There are other alternative explanations for consumers failing to act in privacy protecting ways online:  
Bernstein, Paradoxes, supra note ___, at 290 (suggesting that consumers are actually unaware of the extent 
of privacy threats accordingly online which leads them to fail to adequately protect their privacy using 
already available technological tools and social behaviors). 
253
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 87; Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502. 
254
  For an example of this, see Owen Thomas, Your Privacy is an Illusion:  Bank Intern Busted by 
Facebook (Gawker, November 17, 2007, available at http://valleywag.gawker.com/321802/tech/your-
privacy-is-an-illusion/bank-intern-busted-by-facebook, last viewed on January 23, 2009) (example of 
employer finding image on Facebook of employee at a Halloween party on a day when employee was 
allegedly out of the office for a family emergency – and associated comment on the story by web users). 
255
  1267623 Ontario Inc v Nexx Online Inc, [1999] O.J. No. 2246 (Court File No. C20546/99, Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, Toronto, Ontario, June 14, 1999) (“[Netiquette] is defined as the growing body 
of acceptable, though as yet largely unwritten, etiquette with respect to conduct by users of the Internet.”) 
256
  In 1995, for example, Intel promulgated a set of guidelines in the form of a generally available 
memo for the Internet community.  These “Netiquette Guidelines”256 contained suggestions about 
appropriate use of email services for the then-new generation of Internet users who had not “grown up with 
the Internet”:  Intel, Netiquette Guidelines, available at http://www.albury.net.au/new-users/rfc1855.txt, last 
viewed on July 18, 2008. 
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privacy into account.  Indeed, many OSN service providers currently do incorporate 
privacy provisions into their terms of use.257  However, there are problems with 
enforcement of these terms generally,258 and with the fact that many victims of privacy 
incursions are not parties to these contracts.259  Some OSNs have privacy policies that 
resemble attempts to articulate new forms of netiquette.260  These are generally available 
statements of best practices by an OSN provider about its aspirations to appropriately 
protect user privacy.261  However, terms of use and privacy policies differ from netiquette 
and social norms in the sense that they are generally written from the point of view of an 
OSN provider, not the individuals using the service.  Thus, they focus on what the service 
provider will or will not do with personal information, rather than with the kind of respect 
individual users of the service should pay to each other’s privacy.  Emerging online 
norms, or netiquette, must take account of both the appropriate behavior of OSN 
providers vis-à-vis private individuals, and the appropriate behavior of individuals 
amongst themselves.262 
 
Some OSNs attempt to outline a form of netiquette, describing ways in which 
users of their services should treat each other.  YouTube and Flickr each have a set of 
“Community Guidelines” along these lines.263  The Community Guidelines cover issues 
like ensuring that no inappropriate content is posted, and remembering that children may 
be looking at information and video files.  They additionally include terms like:  “Flickr 
is not a venue for you to harass, abuse, impersonate, or intimidate others. If we receive a 
valid complaint about your conduct, we’ll send you a warning or terminate your 
account”.264  Flickr also includes the simple suggestion:  “Don’t be creepy.”265  The 
guidelines do not say anything about protecting others’ privacy rights, although they do 
talk about respecting others’ copyrights.266     
                                                 
257
  See discussion in Part II.B supra. 
258
  id. 
259
  id. 
260
  See, for example, Facebook’s Privacy Policy, available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php, 
last viewed on July 18, 2008. 
261
  id. 
262
           Intel’s Netiquette Guidelines focus on behavior amongst individuals using text-based electronic 
communications services, while at the same time acknowledging the role of service providers in the 
behavioral equation.  See, for example, clause 1.0 (“Individuals should be aware that no matter who 
supplies their Internet access, be it an Internet Service Provider through a private account, or a student 
account at a University, or an account through a corporation, that those organizations have regulations 
about ownership of mail and files, about what is proper to post or send, and how to present yourself.  Be 
sure to check with the local authority for specific guidelines.”); clause 4.1.1 (“Remember that all these 
services belong to someone else.  The people who pay the bills get to make the rules governing usage.  
Information may be free - or it may not be!  Be sure you check.”) 
263
  Flickr Community Guidelines, available at http://www.flickr.com/guidelines.gne, last viewed on 
July 22, 2008; YouTube Community Guidelines, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines, last viewed on July 22, 2008.  In fact, Flickr expresses 
that its Community Guidelines are part of its terms of use so they may have contractual force as well as 
reflecting desired social norms:  Flickr Community Guidelines, supra note ___, (“Don’t forget that your 
use of Flickr is subject to these Guidelines and our Terms of Use.”) 
264
  id. 
265
  id. 
266
  id. In particular, Flickr suggests ways of amicably resolving copyright disputes by encouraging 
first that a complainant privately contact the alleged copyright violator.  Then, if that does not succeed, the 
Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video 
  40 
 
Flickr’s Community Guidelines also ask users of the service not to “upload 
anything that isn’t theirs”.267  However, closer inspection of the relevant clause suggests 
that this is geared towards copyright protection rather than privacy protection.  The 
definition of “stuff that isn’t yours” states that:  “This includes other people’s photos, 
video and/or stuff you've collected from around the Internet.”  The possessive pronoun 
here relates to “photos, videos and other stuff”, suggesting that it is the ownership of a 
digital image that is important to Flickr, rather than the holder of privacy interests in the 
image.  In other words, where the photographer is a different person to the photographic 
subject, it would seem that Flickr’s guidelines only contemplate protection of the 
photographer’s rights in the image, not the rights of the photographic subject.268 
 
In contrast to services like Flickr and YouTube, some of the closed networks like 
MySpace and Facebook do not have specific sets of Community Guidelines outside of 
their standard terms of use and privacy policies.  This may be because their users are 
automatically regarded as having more control of content because of the closed nature of 
the network.  Thus, there is less perceived need to promulgate a set of Community 
Guidelines.269  In other words, if users are able to limit views of their content to “friends” 
authorized to access their profiles, then there is less need for the service provider to 
promulgate a set of rules about how community members should treat each other.  
Community members can rely on the technical defaults they set to limit uses others may 
make of their information.270   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
complainant is requested to file a notice of infringement with the “Yahoo! Copyright Team” who will 
resolve the matter.  Their Community Guidelines state that:  “If you see photos or videos that you’ve 
created in another member’s photostream, don't panic. This is probably just a misunderstanding and not 
malicious. A good first step is to contact them and politely ask them to remove it. If that doesn't work, 
please file a Notice of Infringement with the Yahoo! Copyright Team who will take it from there. You may 
be tempted to post an entry on your photostream or in our public forum about what's happening, but that's 
not the best way to resolve a possible copyright problem. We don't encourage singling out individuals like 
this on Flickr.” 
267
  Flickr Community Guidelines, supra note ___. 
268
  YouTube’s community guidelines similarly protect copyright, but do not specifically mention 
privacy interests:  YouTube Community Guidelines, supra note ___, (“Respect copyright. Only upload 
videos that you made or that you are authorized to use. This means don't upload videos you didn't make, or 
use content in your videos that someone else owns the copyright to, such as music tracks, snippets of 
copyrighted programs, or videos made by other users, without necessary authorizations. Read our 
Copyright Tips for more information.”) 
269
  This assertion may find support in the fact that one of the most “open” of all networks, the 
Wikipedia, has an extremely detailed set of guidelines referred to as “Wikiquette” to assist people posting 
information to behave appropriately vis-à-vis other posters.  See Wikipedia:  Etiquette, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Etiquette, last viewed on July 23, 2008; CASS SUNSTEIN, 
INFOTOPIA:  HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE, 155 (2006) (“When active debates are occurring 
about the content of articles, it is necessary to have good norms to provide some discipline.  The term 
“Wikiquette” refers to the etiquette that Wikipedians follow.  Wikiquette helps to ensure that the active 
debates are transferred to separate “talk pages.”  These are the deliberative forums on Wikipedia, in which 
those who disagree explain the basis for their disagreement.  What is noteworthy is that the articles 
themselves are (mostly) solid, and that partisan debats have a specifically designed location.”) 
270
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 226 (“Facebook, for example, offers tools to label the photographs 
one submits and to indicate what groups of people can and cannot see them.”) 
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Of course, this is only true to a point, but it may explain the difference between 
open and closed networks in terms of the perceived need to articulate Community 
Guidelines.271  Paradoxically, users of closed OSNs such as Facebook may be particularly 
vulnerable to unbridled dissemination of their personal information and images due to 
developing norms against rejecting requests from people who want to “friend” you 
online.272  Norms also appear to be developing that you cannot “unfriend” someone once 
you have accepted them as a friend.273  Thus, the apparent control a user has on Facebook 
over who accesses their information may be much more illusory than it appears. 
 
Outside the OSN context, the “spoiler” communities that investigate likely 
outcomes of reality television shows provide some useful examples of emerging online 
norms about privacy.    One example involves the online communities that privately 
investigate likely contestants and outcomes on the popular Survivor television series.274  
These communities try to ascertain the identities of contestants on upcoming series of 
Survivor, the locations in which upcoming series will be filmed, and the order in which 
contestants will be voted off the program.275  Of course, attempts to investigate the lives 
of actual contestants tread a fine line between legitimate fan interest in the program and 
invading the privacy of the contestants.276  One norm that has developed within the 
Survivor spoiler community is the use of “brain trusts”.277  These are small subsets of the 
spoiler community who conduct much of the detailed investigation of contestants through 
encrypted websites that are not accessible to the general online community.278  Part of the 
aim here is to protect the privacy of the contestants, as well as ensuring a higher degree of 
accuracy once the brain trust posts its findings to the general community.279  The use of 
encryption technology to protect discussions implicating contestants’ privacy suggests an 
intriguing interplay between developing privacy norms and system architecture. 
 
All of these examples evidence ways in which online communities are beginning 
to develop and recognize privacy norms, including norms relating to video files.  Thus, it 
may now be time to take stock of video privacy norms, and to attempt to ascertain where 
laws, technologies, and market practices, are lagging behind community expectations of 
privacy. For example, there currently appear to be no prevailing rules about the 
                                                 
271
  Norms may also play a part in this distinction.  Those posting to YouTube may expect public 
availability of content, while those posting in closed networks expect more privacy protections. 
272
  CORY DOCTOROW, CONTENT, 183 (2008) (“It’s socially awkward to refuse to add someone to your 
friends list – but removing someone from your friends list is practically a declaration of war.”) 
273
  id. 
274
  Survivor is shown on the CBS network in the United States.  For a detailed history of the series 
and its development, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivor_(US_TV_series), last viewed on December 
10, 2008.  See also HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE:  WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE, 25 
(2006) (describing Survivor as a popular CBS show that started the reality television trend). 
275
  JENKINS, supra note ___, 25-26. 
276
  id., 36-7 (“[T]here is a thin, thin line between investigating those who have chosen to insert 
themselves into the public spotlight and stalking them at their home or workplace …. The community 
spends a great deal of time debating, exactly where you draw the line.”) 
277
  id, 38. 
278
  id. 
279
  id. (“The brain trusts … argue that this closed-door vetting process protects privacy and ensures a 
high degree of accuracy once they do post their findings.”) 
Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video 
  42 
“tagging”280 of photographs to make them more easily searchable.281  Salient issues about 
appropriate regulation here would be whether there are any identifiable norms relating to 
the impact tagging might have on individual privacy.  Even if an individual has consented 
to the posting of her image on Facebook, and acknowledges the possibility that others 
may see it and copy it, does that necessarily mean that she consents to tagging which 
enables easier and potentially larger scale searching and copying of the image?282  It 
would be interesting to find out how OSN users feel about this issue.283  Norms could 
then be calibrated with legal rules that encourage best practices in technologies, online 
contracting, and other market and social practices.   
 
C.  MARKET FORCES 
 
Market forces often go hand in hand with social norms.  Social desires and 
expectations dictate, to a certain extent, what the market is able to sell, and perhaps 
paradoxically, the market can dictate social norms through the nature of its products and 
services.284  If all market players provide products that are limited to a given sub-set of 
possible social behaviors then social behaviors will, by default, have to conform to what 
is available in the market.  However, if consumers are not happy with the available 
choices, they may either refuse to buy a service at all, or they may petition the service 
provider to change the service to better conform to their expectations.  The immediate 
user backlash against Facebook’s “Beacon” advertising scheme launched in late 2007 is 
an example of consumers demanding changes to an online service to better suit their 
privacy expectations.285 
 
                                                 
280
  “Tags” are currently defined by Wikipedia as follows:  “A tag is a non-hierarchical keyword or 
term assigned to a piece of information (such as an internet bookmark, digital image, or computer file). 
This kind of metadata helps describe an item and allows it to be found again by browsing or searching. 
Tags are chosen informally and personally by the item's creator or by its viewer, depending on the system. 
On a website in which many users tag many items, this collection of tags becomes a folksonomy.” (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tag_(metadata), last viewed on February 1, 2009). 
281
  Edwards and Brown, supra note ___, at [10-17 of draft]. 
282
  Of course, tagging also potentially assists with searching and removal of content where an image 
subject might have objected to its online dissemination, so the technology cuts both ways here. 
283
  Professor Zittrain has noted that tagging may only be the beginning of the problem for online 
image privacy as facial recognition software becomes more sophisticated and video images can now be 
matched quite easily with tagged text descriptions:  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 214 (“Web sites like Riya, 
Polar Rose, and MyHeritage are perfecting facial recognition technologies so that once photos of a 
particular person are tagged a few times with his or her name, their computers can then automatically label 
all future photos that include the person – even if their image appears in the background.”) 
284
  This is not unlike the way that law can communicate norms, but law can also enforce norms.  The 
interplay between modes of regulation can be quite complex and paradoxical at times. 
285
  The Beacon program involved divulging to a user’s “friends” what products the user had bought 
online on the basis that the user’s friends may be interested in similar products.  See discussion in William 
McGeveran, Facebook Retreats Somewhat on Beacon Privacy, Info/Law, December 2, 2007 (available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/12/02/facebook-retreats-socialads/, last viewed on July 24, 
2008); SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 80 (citing various examples of online service 
provides cancelling initiatives due to public outcry about privacy, including Yahoo! eliminating a reverse 
telephone number search from its People Search site). 
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Commentators have been skeptical about the inclination of markets to regulate 
online privacy.286  The Internet allows market players to make gains from individuals’ 
personal information with very little legal recourse available for loss of privacy.  Where 
are the incentives for market players to protect privacy in the absence of government 
regulation?287  Maybe in the situations under discussion in this article industry self-
regulation might fare better than it has in the context of text-based data aggregation.  In 
the OSN context, at least as relates to video images, we are not talking about information 
that has commercial value when aggregated into large databases.288  While textual 
information from a personal profile on Facebook might be of interest to online marketers, 
video information is less likely to have any significant appeal.  Even if it were possible to 
utilize images to ascertain whether an image subject might be interested in a certain style 
of clothing, for example, the difficulties in processing video information in a way that 
easily identifies the subject’s details for targeted advertising purposes likely outweigh 
any commensurate benefits of doing so, at least on the basis of today’s technology. 
 
Because of these attributes of online video, it is arguable that the interests of OSN 
service providers and their users in terms of privacy protection are not so disparate.  If 
OSN service providers obtain more commercial value by protecting their users’ privacy 
than by failing to do so, there may be sufficient market incentives for those service 
providers to compete with each other in offering privacy protections to their users.  
Facebook, for example, does offer stronger privacy protections in relation to video files 
than some of its competitors.289  However, the fact that it has strongly worded privacy 
protections in its terms of use does not necessarily mean that it enforces them in practice.  
Facebook is also interesting in that it markets itself as having strong privacy protections.  
Nevertheless, it has been criticized for attempts to utilize information derived from its 
users to market items to their online “friends”.290   
 
This evidences a distinct practical problem with over-reliance on markets as 
privacy regulators.  What an entity says it does, and what it actually does may be two 
different things.  An OSN provider can use promises of privacy to entice users to accept 
its services, and then can fail to live up to those promises even to the extent of engaging 
                                                 
286
  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 63 (“There is much to be skeptical about 
with [a solution to privacy problems involving market regulation] – not the least of which being that the 
interests of commerce might well be different from the interests of the consumer.”); Mark Lemley, Private 
Property, 52 STAN L REV 1545, 1554 (2000) (“If we want privacy, we must be willing to accept the fact 
that there is no good “market solution” and endorse some government regulation of the behavior of data 
collectors.”); Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1524-5 (expressing skepticism about industry self-regulation in 
the absence of a serious threat of government regulation). 
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  Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1524-5 (expressing skepticism about industry self-regulation in the 
absence of a serious threat of government regulation). 
288
  id., at 1469 (“Data accumulation enables the construction of personal data profiles.  When the data 
are available to others, they can construct personal profiles for targeted marketing, and even, in rare cases, 
blackmail.”)  
289
  See discussion in Part II.B supra. 
290
  William McGeveran, Facebook Inserting Users Into Ads, Info/Law, November 8, 2007 (available 
at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/11/08/facebook-social-ads/, last viewed on July 24, 2008); 
Megan McCarthy, Facebook Ads Make You the Star – and You May Not Know It, Wired Blog Network, 
January 2, 2008 (available at http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/01/facebook-ads-ma.html, last viewed on 
July 24, 2008). 
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in conduct that completely contradicts its promises.291  In a perfect market, the consumer 
would simply take her business elsewhere.  Yet, in online markets there is often no 
competitive “elsewhere” to go – and the transaction costs of moving all of your personal 
information to another OSN are high292 relative to the benefits of doing so.  If you want to 
interact socially online, you may have little real choice between service providers.   
 
There are a number of other difficulties with reliance on privacy policies to 
protect consumers’ interests online.  There are problems of inequality of bargaining 
power between consumers and OSN providers.293  Even if a large group of consumers 
objects to a privacy policy, there are collective action problems.  It is often difficult for 
consumers to collectively express their privacy preferences to OSN providers.294  Privacy 
policies tend to be fairly toothless in practice.  These policies are often drafted in vague, 
aspirational terms with little serious attempt at making specific representations of exactly 
how a user’s privacy will be protected.295  Additionally, privacy policies tend to be 
regularly updated unilaterally by OSN providers, thus putting an unrealistic obligation on 
users to routinely check back on the policy to keep track of the privacy terms.296  Market 
forces may be a useful and important form of regulation.  However, market incentives are 
often insufficient to effectively protect users’ privacy.297  This may be an area in which it 
is necessary for legal rules to interact with market forces to facilitate more appropriate 
outcomes.298   
 
D.  SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 
System architecture has been defined as:  “technologies for re-creating privacy 
where other technologies may have erased it.”299  One salient example of a privacy 
protecting architecture is the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) project, which 
supports the development of software code that allows websites and Internet users to set 
automatic privacy default preferences on their computers that other computers can read 
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  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 81-87 (describing failures of contracts and 
market forces in protecting privacy). 
292
  For example, the costs of moving relevant information and perhaps even having to set up a new 
email account along with a new personal profile – and notifying others of your new email address. 
293
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 82. 
294
  id. 
295
  id, at 83. 
296
  id. 
297
  Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1527 (“A more generic problem with self-regulatory schemes, even 
those limited to e-commerce or Web sites in general, is that they regulate only those motivated or 
principled enough to take part in them.”) 
298
  In the associated context of online data aggregation and privacy concerns, Professor Froomkin has 
suggested the need for an approach that combines legislation, market forces, and social norms:  Froomkin, 
supra note ___, at 1528 (“One way of creating incentives for accurate, if not necessarily ideal, privacy 
policies would be to use legislation, market forces, and the litigiousness of Americans to create a self-
policing (as opposed to self-regulating) system for Web-based data collection.”) 
299
  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note __, at 63.  For completeness, it should be noted 
that others have defined architecture more broadly in this context.  Professor Solove, for example, appears 
to contemplate that system architecture includes hardware and software as well as the default attributes of 
relationships between individuals and those who control or process their information:  SOLOVE, THE 
DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 97-101. 
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without the need for human intervention.300  For example, if a user sets high privacy 
settings, her computer might automatically deny access to certain websites that do not 
meet those standards.  Architecture can have a profound impact on privacy.301  One of its 
obvious advantages is that it can be more proactive than many other forms of 
regulation.302  It creates ex ante constraints that prevent harm, while laws, for example, 
often provide remedies after harms have occurred.303  Nevertheless, the problem with 
architecture is that it does not necessarily work well on its own.  Privacy-enhancing 
technologies can be expensive and there is often little incentive for OSNs to invest in it 
absent government regulation requiring them to do so.  While there may be incentives for 
consumers to invest in privacy-enhacing technologies, many consumers are insufficiently 
knowledgeable to work with these technologies.  This is where public education plays an 
important role in the privacy matrix.304   
 
Some OSNs already do employ privacy-enhancing architectures.  A salient 
example is the closed network format utilized by Facebook and MySpace.  These services 
use technology to limit users to accessing information of other users that they are 
authorized to access.305  There are other examples where technological solutions may be 
implemented to better protect online video privacy.  For example, Professors Edwards 
and Brown have suggested the possibility of automatic data expiration settings to combat 
the permanency problem of digital data in the OSN context.306  Of course, expiration 
settings do not automatically deal with the problems of unauthorized dissemination of 
images prior to the expiration of the original post, or of the permanence of any copies 
made available on other websites.  Especially if images have been tagged, they may be 
easy to find on multiple websites even after the original image has expired.  In fact, with 
projects such as the Internet Archive, many images will continue to be available in some 
                                                 
300
  See Platform for Privacy Preferences Project website:  available at 
http://www.w3.org/P3P/Overview.html, last viewed on December 17, 2008. 
301
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 200 (“The technological design of the 
websites has an enormous impact on people’s privacy.”); Joel Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global 
Electronic Highways:  Merging Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV J L & TECH 187 (1993); 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note ___; Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1529-1533 (describing 
potential for use of privacy enhancing technologies as a form of system architecture to protect privacy). 
302
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 100. 
303
  id.; LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 122 (“[A]s with the market, architecture effects its 
constraint through simultaneous conditions.  These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing 
contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by “architecture.””) 
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  See discussion in Part IV.E infra. 
305
  On Facebook, you cannot access any detailed information about another user unless you ask them 
if you can be their “friend”, and they accept you as a “friend” over the network:  See Facebook’s Profile 
Page, available at http://www.facebook.com/privacy/?view=profile, last viewed on July 24, 2008 (allowing 
Facebook users to limit access to their profiles to “friends”, or even to “friends of friends”).  Facebook also 
allows users to block particular people from accessing their profiles:  See Facebook, “Block People”, 
available at http://www.facebook.com/privacy/ , last viewed on July 24, 2008 (“If you block someone, they 
will not be able to find you in a Facebook search, see your profile, or interact with you through Facebook 
channels (such as Wall posts, Poke, etc.). Any Facebook ties you currently have with a person you block 
will be broken (for example, friendship connections, Relationship Status, etc.). Note that blocking someone 
may not prevent all communications and interactions in third-party applications, and does not extend to 
elsewhere on the Internet.”) 
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  Edwards and Brown, supra note ___, at [10-31 of current draft]. 
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form even after all “live” images have been removed from relevant websites.307  
Nevertheless, automatic expiration settings would, to some extent, limit the availability of 
some personal information online.  If multiple sites adopted the practice of automatic data 
expiration, then even copied images would eventually be removed from multiple sites, 
thus potentially lessening the permanency problem. 
 
Technological solutions might also be developed to prevent unauthorized cutting 
and pasting of digital video files in the absence of consent by the image holder and the 
image subject.  Code can be written to prohibit cutting and pasting,308 while at the same 
time sending a request to the image holder and image subject for permission to 
disseminate the image.  The holder and subject could then respond, and that response 
could translate into a permission or non-permission to use the image.  If a response was 
not received from either the image holder or the image subject, the service could simply 
refuse permission to copy the image.309  Alternatively, or additionally, the image could be 
tagged with permissions when originally uploaded.  This would not prevent unauthorized 
disseminations of images per se, but it would bring the privacy preferences of the image 
subject into public view.  Such an approach may assist in online norm development.  In 
fact, some OSNs are experimenting with these kinds of tags.  Facebook has offered 
technology to label photographs in order to indicate what groups of people are authorized 
to view them.310  However, this system is limited in that the tags are lost when an image is 
copied outside the Facebook network.311  To fully protect privacy, tags would have to be 
utilized by image subjects as well as owners of online images.  This could prove 
unwieldy in practice. 
 
This is obviously not a comprehensive survey of technological solutions to video 
privacy problems.  It is merely intended to establish the availability of technological 
options that have not yet been seriously investigated and that might better protect online 
privacy.  Many technologies that would enable enhanced privacy protection for video 
images are in existence today and have yet to be implemented in this context.  The failure 
to apply them likely has to do with a combination of factors including: (a) assumptions 
by some online service providers that users do not care sufficiently about privacy to make 
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  Using the “Wayback Machine” on the Internet Archive, one can browse through historical records 
of 85 billion web pages archived since 1996:  http://www.archive.org/web/web.php, last viewed on 
September 29, 2008. 
308
  Copy control technologies online have been utilized in the copyright context extensively in recent 
years.  See, for example, discussion of copy control technologies employed by Adobe with respect to the 
sale of eBooks in LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 147-153. 
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  This would not be dissimilar to the Creative Commons license utilized to express copyright 
holders’ preferences as to permitted uses of a given copyright work:  see, Creative Commons, Choosing a 
License:  Creative Commons Licenses, available at http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/meet-the-
licenses, last viewed on July 30, 2008.  See also ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 225 (“As people put data on 
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  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 226 (“Facebook … offers tools to label the photographs one submits 
and to indicate what groups of people can and cannot see them.  Once a photo is copied beyond the 
Facebook environment, however, these attributes are lost.”) 
311
  id. 
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it worth their while to employ these technologies;312 (b) lack of awareness of these 
technologies by users; (c) lack of financial incentives for online service providers to 
develop and deploy these technologies;313 and, (d) lack of clarity about social norms 
regarding online privacy, particularly in the video and multi-media context.  Some of the 
more obvious advantages of developing technological solutions to emerging privacy 
problems are their effectiveness314 and their global reach.315  For example, if OSNs such as 
Facebook wanted to better protect privacy on a global scale, it would be a simple matter 
for them to create technological privacy defaults that would automatically operate in all 
countries where their services were accessible.316     
 
E.  EDUCATION 
 
In recent years, commentators have started to focus on new modes of regulation 
that may be equally important for online privacy as the four regulatory modalities 
discussed above.  One example is public education.317  In the context of online privacy, 
we should consider who has the responsibility to educate the public, and how prescriptive 
or otherwise such education may be.318  If, for example, social norms really are yet to 
develop in many online contexts, then education, at least at this point in time, might best 
be aimed at generating more of a public dialogue on privacy than on instructing the 
public about privacy.  On the other hand, the public should certainly be instructed about 
currently available privacy-enhancing technologies so that these technologies might be 
used more effectively in practice. 
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  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 82 (“Companies only rarely compete on the 
basis of the amount of privacy they offer.  People often do not weigh privacy policies heavily when 
choosing companies.”) 
313
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users of that service). 
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  Abril, (My)Space, supra note ___, at 87 (suggesting that OSNs have a role as public educators 
with respect to online privcy). 
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Public education is currently an important, if under-utilized, regulatory modality 
for online privacy, both in the video context and with respect to unauthorized uses and 
disseminations of personal information more generally.  Even if the education component 
only consists of explanations about the loss of control people increasingly have over their 
personal information online, this might inform the development of social norms.  It might 
facilitate a situation where Internet users are more cautious about what information they 
disclose online, both about themselves and about their friends and acquaintances.  The 
final regulatory modality addressed here – private or non-profit institutions – potentially 
interacts usefully with public education in that many of these institutions can serve an 
important public education role. 
 
F.  INSTITUTIONS  
 
Another mode of regulating privacy revolves around the recognition of 
institutions as privacy regulators.319  In a recent article on the importance of “intellectual 
privacy”, Professor Neil Richards utilizes the example of libraries, and in particular, the 
American Library Association (ALA) in promoting free speech and intellectual liberty 
against the threat of government surveillance.320  He discusses the ALA’s 1939 library bill 
of rights which declared aspirations of intellectual freedom and privacy of library 
patrons.321  Others have recognized the importance of institutions as regulators in various 
online contexts.  Professor Lessig, for example, has emphasized the work of non-profit 
institutions as a potential regulatory modality in the digital copyright context.  He cites 
the examples of the Public Library of Science (PLoS)322 and the Creative Commons323 as 
non-profit organizations whose work aims to facilitate more effective use of copyright 
works for the benefit of society as a whole.324   
 
Institutions can also serve an important role in advocating for law reform.  Some 
institutions might investigate social norms on issues like privacy, and advocate for 
legislation that better reflects those norms.  Additionally, some institutions such as the 
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  Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note___, at 33. 
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  id., at 33-34. 
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  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 281-282. 
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  The PLoS is a nonprofit organization that maintains a repository of scientific work in electronic 
form that is made permanently available for free:  id, at 281-282.  The Creative Commons is a nonprofit 
corporation that assists copyright holders in granting more flexible permissions for uses of their works:  id, 
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www.creativecommons.org, last viewed on July 30, 2008.). 
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EFF325 routinely file amicus briefs in judicial proceedings,326 thus playing into the judicial 
side of the regulatory equation.  The question for video privacy in the OSN context, and 
online privacy generally, is whether there are currently any institutions that could 
appropriately fulfill an institutional regulatory function.  Because most of the players in 
the OSN privacy matrix are commercial enterprises and private Internet users, it is 
difficult to identify an analog to the ALA, the PLoS, or Creative Commons in the privacy 
context.  The closest obvious contenders are some public interest organizations that aim 
to protect rights and freedoms online, such as the EFF and the EPIC.327  Other similar 
organizations may be developed in the future specifically to take on an institutional role 
in protecting privacy online. 
 
These kinds of organizations tend not to be particularly well funded,328 at least as 
compared with corporate interests.  They certainly do important work in advocating for 
the rights of Internet users who may not be able to protect their own individual interests 
online because of collective action problems, or lack of knowledge about relevant law 
and technology.  Perhaps part of the regulatory equation for protecting privacy online 
should be to pay more attention to, and encourage funding for, organizations such as the 
EFF and EPIC.  At the very least, these kinds of institutions can play an important 
regulatory role, particularly as public educator and advocate,329 in protecting online 
privacy.     
 
Academic institutions are another set of non-profit organizations that can play a 
public education role.330  They can assist in developing statements of best practices about 
online privacy, as well as disseminating information to the public about these issues.  
This is already done through conferences and symposia.331  A greater array of 
publications, and greater accessibility of conferences and conference proceedings, 
including free online availability,332 could be a useful aspect of the ongoing privacy 
matrix.  Clearly public education and institutions as regulatory modalities have 
significant synergies, and they could be more usefully employed in the future 
development of online privacy principles, alongside the other regulatory modalities. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Privacy has become the object of considerable concern.  The purely fortuitous intrusions 
inherent in a compact and interrelated society have multiplied.  The more insidious 
intrusions of increasingly sophisticated scientific devices into previously untouched 
areas, and the burgeoning claims of public and private agencies to personal information, 
have created a new sense of urgency in defense of privacy. 
 
- Professor Charles Fried333 
 
As evidenced by Professor Fried’s comments from the late 1960s, privacy rights 
have been of significant concern since long before the Internet generation.  However, the 
exponential rise of online privacy-destroying technologies334 has led to increasing 
concerns about individual privacy in recent years.  The scope and scale of online privacy 
violations can be truly devastating, as evidenced by the fate of dog poop girl, Star Wars 
kid, and Bus Uncle.  A number of regulatory avenues have been identified to better 
protect digital privacy.  However, the pace of technological change raises significant 
challenges for successful regulation.  It is now time to start thinking more urgently about 
creating a workable matrix of regulatory approaches that better protects online privacy, 
particularly with respect to video and multi-media files disseminated online.     
 
One might argue that this article has overstated the case about the need for digital 
video privacy regulation.  Commentators have suggested that privacy is not a highly held 
value in cyberspace335 so there is no need to protect it.336  With respect to OSNs in 
particular, some would argue that privacy concerns are a “blip” phenomenon, and that 
time will educate Internet users to be more careful about video images and other 
information they place online, or allow to be placed online about them.337  However, these 
views are problematic for a number of reasons.  For one thing, even if current Internet 
users’ apparent carelessness about personal information online is temporary, the effects 
of this carelessness may be widespread, permanent, and devastating because of the global 
and increasingly archival nature of today’s online content.338  Coupled with the 
aggregation and contextualization problems identified in Part II, the “blip” of unfortunate 
behavior today may have serious long term consequences for many people.   
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The Internet fundamentally challenges our perspectives on social, political, and 
economic behaviors every decade or so.  Each shift requires decision makers to re-think 
basic assumptions about human interaction within progressively shorter timeframes.  
User-generated content on OSNs is a new crunch point in this online evolution, 
particularly as regards privacy.  This article has demonstrated that serious privacy harms 
can result from unbridled dissemination of video files online.  It suggests that it is time to 
consider a new multi-modal regulatory approach to protect individual privacy.  If we do 
not act now, privacy-destroying norms may become entrenched and it will be much more 
difficult to protect privacy in the future.  Even over-zealous action now can be reined in 
later if subsequently found to be overly protective of privacy to the detriment of other 
important interests such as free speech.  There is little downside to considering regulatory 
action to protect privacy.  Regulation, imperfect as it may be, can be revised later, but 
today’s video privacy incursions may have far-reaching and potentially devastating 
consequences. 
